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 Preface 
 
 
 
 
Despite the title, this book isn’t intended as an attack on the Wikipedia. 
In fact, I have been (and perhaps still am) an editor of the Wikipedia, 
and turn to it often as a convenient reference for topics where consensus 
is a foregone conclusion, since it is an outstanding aggregator of trivia. 
What I am arguing in this book, however, is the Wikipedia cannot be     
a source of knowledge, in part because of the uncertainties that neces- 
sarily accompany using it as a source. Yet the deeper claim I am devel- 
oping here isn’t directed at the Wikipedia, since my argument extends  
to all encyclopaedias that have ever been written, and perhaps that ever 
could be written, since aggregation of facts is radically disconnected 
from knowledge as it ought to be understood. 
 
The contents of this book do attack something, however, something that 
I am trying to reform, expose, or even perhaps entirely destroy: anony- 
mous peer review. I write papers for conferences and journals that go 
through this arcane ritual, and I review papers for conferences and jour- 
nals and must thus accord with its strange and hierophantic oddities. I 
consider the entire process to be thoroughly immoral, for reasons that 
shall become clear in due course, and always append a note to my own 
reports stating my willingness to be identified to the authors whose work 
I am reviewing. Masks, despite the mythology of superheroes, do not 
bring out the best in people. Furthermore, the practice of concealing   
the identities  of everyone  involved  in an assessment  of written work  
is utterly and inescapably counter-productive, having more-or-less the 
opposite effect of what is intended. The confused picture of knowledge 
which makes anonymous peer review seem reasonable – even ethically 
desirable – is something that I hope that my arguments here manage to 
bring into question. 
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Nonetheless, my purpose in writing this book was not to launch an attack 
on anonymous peer review: that battle has already begun; I am merely 
joining the growing movement that recognises what a horrendous mis- 
step there has been within the academy in the unthinking acceptance of 
the rhetoric of secrecy as a road to truth. Rather, I wrote this book, and 
the blog posts that comprise its earliest draft, because I wanted to sort 
out, in my own head, the tremendous confusion about knowledge, reality, 
and expertise that has dominated thinking within my lifetime. My hope, 
of course, is that other people will read what I have written and see that, 
as Isabelle Stengers and Philippe Pignarre are fond of saying, “another 
world is possible”, a slogan associated with opposition to capitalism, but 
which can inspire us without us having to identify a specific ‘enemy’. 
My further hope is that this book will be part of an ongoing conversation, 
an example of the virtuous discourse I have committed to furthering. 
 
A key claim I develop in this book – that the connection between 
anonymity and truth is one that ought to be challenged – took an inter- 
esting turn shortly after I finished the draft manuscript and announced   
it to the world. Nine days after this, a Wikipedia Czar called a tribunal, 
and within a week the page about me had been deleted. While this could 
be a coincidence, after a decade of no interest at all in my page it cer- 
tainly seems like a retaliatory gesture – and one, I might add, that would 
violate the values and policies of the Wikipedia if that were its motiva- 
tion. In a brutal irony, it is this kind of abuse that Wikipedia Knows Noth- 
ing warns about, while maintaining the inherent value and potential of 
wikis as tools. It might well be that I am indeed no longer ‘Notable’, 
since Wikipedia has undergone considerable notability-inflation in the 
ten years since I was first declared ‘Notable’ in 2006. But the implication 
of what happened to my page, and indeed to many others that have been 
summarily deleted over the years, is rather far from the egalitarian claims 
that the Wikipedia is something ‘anyone can edit’. 
 
The book is organised around four questions, all of which are concerned 
with what philosopher’s call epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. I 
wanted to mention this here, in the preface, as I shall be trying to  avoid 
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words like ‘epistemology’ in the book’s chapters, since I hope to write  
a book that can be read by anyone, and not just academics. I shall prob- 
ably fail. But I remain inspired by Mary Midgley’s remarkable talent to 
combine erudition and accessibility in her books, and strive towards this 
ideal in all my philosophy – for all that the temptation to use some eso- 
teric term (like ‘hierophantic’) all too often leads me astray. Philosophy 
is a service just like plumbing, and it ought to be there for whomever 
needs it. Indeed, Midgley frequently compares philosophy to ‘conceptual 
plumbing’. I prefer to call it ‘nerds with words’. 
 
While I’m airing my philosophical laundry, a short note about my use   
of the phrase ‘fundamentally immoral’. This may appear to be an appeal 
to rational foundations of morality that no-one could reject, in the man- 
ner of Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant. My position on moral 
philosophy, as developed in Chaos Ethics, does not rely upon this kind 
of foundational argument: I always assume different moral practices will 
be in play in any contentious situation. My assertion that anonymous 
reviewers are pursuing a fundamentally immoral practice is thus based 
upon the simpler claim that any moral argument that could be used to 
defend double-blind peer review will be vulnerable either to the epis- 
temic argument I develop throughout this book that a commitment to 
the truth should mandate transparent, co-operative review practices, or 
to Kant’s argument for transparency, presented in the third chapter. ‘Fun- 
damentally immoral’ thus means solely that there is no viable moral 
argument for the anonymity of reviewers that doesn’t entail fatal incon- 
sistencies. 
 
To my infinite surprise, I found I have chosen endnotes – and this deci- 
sion has occurred despite my agreement with my aesthetician colleague 
Nils Stear that trying to read endnotes “is like eating French fries thirty 
feet from the ketchup bowl”. The problem he alludes to is one I am 
equally frustrated with, which is when a subsidiary thought is buried in 
an endnote, forcing the reader to approach an otherwise linear essay as  
if it were a Fighting Fantasy gamebook (“If you read the pithy aside, 
turn to page 23…”). Nonetheless, I chose endnotes because I wanted the 
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prose to read as cleanly as possible and I have long since eliminated in 
myself the desire to append such subsidiary thoughts: if I cannot get the 
important ideas into my writing, I have not written as well as I should 
like. So yes, I have used endnotes, but you should never feel obligated to 
span the thirty feet to the ketchup bowl since every endnote in this book 
is only ever a citation for further reading. No quips, remarks, observa- 
tions, or insights lie in the notes section – you only need to go there if 
you want to see who I am leaning upon. 
 
My thanks are due to a great many people for their contributions to the 
discussions that led me here, and for their assistance on the road to publi- 
cation. First and foremost, to my wife for continuing to support my ‘phi- 
losophy habit’, and for helping me create the space in our rather crowded 
family life for writing. Thanks are also due to José Zagal for hooking 
me up with Drew Davidson, the editor who has generously taken my 
thoughts and turned them into a paper-and-print book – and a bits-and- 
bytes e-book, my first publication with a Creative Commons license. I 
must offer yet further thanks to Mary Midgley for her continued support 
– and criticism! – of my work, and to Allen Wood for the same. I am 
lucky to have such wonderful minds as correspondents. 
 
Then there are those who I have not met or spoken to, but who have 
massively affected the course of my arguments and investigations. I only 
recently discovered Jacques Rancière’s work, but you will find his fin- 
gerprints all over the final chapter of this book. I do not know that I 
would have had the strength to attempt this without his becoming, for a 
while at least, my muse. I also offer my grateful thanks to someone who 
sadly passed away while I was finishing writing this manuscript: Hilary 
Putnam. He spent much of his career arguing against the picture that this 
book challenges, and we can all find inspiration in his endless willing- 
ness to challenge and revise his own point of view as much as anyone 
else’s. 
 
Enormous gratitude is also owed to those wonderful digital travellers 
who alight from time to time at my blog and share thoughts upon the 
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ideas that have eventually been crafted into this text. A few names are 
obfuscated by nicknames, but none have used it as a mask to deny our 
equality. Thanks in this respect are owed first and foremost to Chris Bil- 
lows, without whose interest in the topic this book might never have 
been written, but also to Peter Crowther, ptermx, Dirk HK, and Bart 
Stewart, not to mention to Matt Mower for inducting me into blogging 
in the first place. Similarly, to those who have had brief exchanges with 
me about this on Twitter, including Ian Bogost, Frank Pasquale, Matt 
Thrower, Dave Morris, Hilda Hernández, and Petri Lankoski, who has 
also had to endure my pontificating about anonymous peer review in the 
context of deploying me as a reviewer. I must also thank translucy, who I 
met at my blog and whose absence there I now miss, who first suggested 
to me the parallel between the Republic of Letters and blogging. 
 
Further thanks must be offered for the more obscure or tangential forces 
that shaped this book, such as Heythrop College Library for loaning me a 
(new and unread) copy of Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor’s Retriev- 
ing Realism, and the librarians of the University of Bolton for arranging 
this for me. This was the capstone of this project in many respects, since 
until reading that particular book I wasn’t sure if I wasn’t just disappear- 
ing down a hole of my own creation – yet here were two philosophers I 
greatly respected making eerily similar arguments, and also drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s idea of a picture that holds us captive. 
 
I’d also like to offer deep and sincere thanks to those who helped to kept 
my morale up in my lonely corners of the internet, such as Oscar Strik 
and Rik Newman, without whom I might have given up hope long, long 
ago. 
 
Finally, I offer my gratitude to you for reading this book. Without you, it 
would be incomplete. 
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What Does Wikipedia Know? 
 
 
 
 
Can someone who looks up a topic on the Wikipedia be said to have 
access to knowledge on that subject? This ubiquitous online reference 
calls itself ‘The Free Encyclopaedia’, or at times ‘The Free Encyclopae- 
dia that anyone can edit’, and boasts, at the time of writing, more than 
five million different pages that can be referred to. But for all that 
Wikipedia is recruited by a vast array of different people to look up a 
great many different kinds of fact, there is still always a lingering doubt 
in our minds about what the Wikipedia can be said to know, and thus 
whether we can reliably claim to know anything when we turn to it as 
our guide. 
Questions concerning what can be said to constitute knowledge have 
been the purview of philosophy for as long as this practice has possessed 
this particular name. The most general formula for understanding what 
constitutes knowledge is justified true belief, and this too is as old as the 
term philosophy itself. Deriving from Plato’s Theaetetus dialogue1, the 
core of the idea is that we can claim to have knowledge when we hold a 
belief about the world that is true, and when we also possess a legitimate 
justification for that belief. I have reasons to question this model, but this 
will have to wait until later. For now, it is sufficient to ask whether any- 
one relying on the Wikipedia can be said to possess justified true belief. 
 
It is clear that there a  good  reasons  for  doubting  that  someone  
whose only source was the Wikipedia can form a justified true  belief.  
In the first place, any time we refer to the Wikipedia, we have no way  
of knowing whether the information recorded there has been    mischie- 
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vously altered by someone, effectively at random. The open editorial 
policy means that we can never eliminate this possibility, which gives us 
reason to doubt the accuracy of anything read there. Furthermore, while 
the content policy means that any claim posted must be referenced to 
some other source, there are limited standards of quality control regard- 
ing this referencing: it is perfectly possible to accurately reference inac- 
curate claims, for instance. So we can also doubt that the Wikipedia,   
by itself, provides any basis for legitimate justification. Indeed, the only 
times we can actually be confident that the Wikipedia has valid content 
in an article is when we know that topic from some other source. At this 
point, the Wikipedia has ceased to be a provider of knowledge at all, and 
has become merely an aide-mémoire; a means of reminding. 
 
How does the Wikipedia differ from, say, a traditional encyclopaedia? 
The construction of a reference work of this kind has traditionally 
involved an editorial team selecting experts in various fields to write arti- 
cles that summarise topics relating to those fields. Clearly, the knowl- 
edge so recorded can still be wrong – examining early twentieth century 
encyclopaedias reveals the extent at which our knowledge has been sub- 
stantially revised just in the last century – but where such a book is 
correct, we have at least a strong claim to justification: the expert who 
drafted the article text was selected precisely because of their knowledge 
of the field in question. We can, in principle at least, possess justified 
true belief if we start from a conventional encyclopaedia to a degree that 
cannot apply to the Wikipedia. The decisive point isn’t the truth of either 
source: it is the lack of reliable claims to justification on behalf of the 
Wikipedia. 
 
What can help make this clear is that the way an encyclopaedia is sup- 
posed to make its claim to recording knowledge is based upon an appeal 
to the authority of experts. The problem with the Wikipedia is that the 
editors are in no way guaranteed to have expert knowledge, and neither 
are they necessarily qualified to distinguish expertise from its alterna- 
tives. This does not make Wikipedia useless: it functions as a gigantic 
(and highly effective) ‘dial-a-geek’, whereby you can get an    informed 
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opinion via a random unknown nerd or cluster of nerds. It is likely to   
be correct when the information is straightforward and uncontested (his- 
torical dates, for instance). But beyond trivia, its claims to knowledge 
become increasingly sketchy. It certainly could contain factual informa- 
tion – but you can never be sure that what you are looking at does consti- 
tute facts, not unless you have some other point of reference to compare 
against. 
This leads to a rather severe conclusion: the Wikipedia knows nothing, 
or rather, someone using the Wikipedia cannot know anything from that 
alone. Whoever refers to a topic on the Wikipedia cannot be said to 
possess justified true beliefs (i.e. knowledge, conventionally construed), 
because no-one who edits the Wikipedia has been credibly selected for 
expertise, creating a gap in justification. Wikipedia editors have self- 
selected based on personal interest – which is why there are so many 
articles about (say) Star Trek and videogames. Indeed, a rough and ready 
search of the contents via a search engine suggests approximately 26,000 
pages about Star Trek, and about 174,000 about videogames, although 
these are likely to be overestimates. Still, the last version of the book 
entitled The Star Trek Encyclopaedia contains only 5,000 entries2 – and 
a typical encyclopaedia contains none. There’s clearly some kind of mis- 
match in this regard. 
 
The process of looking something up on the Wikipedia could still con- 
vey expertise – it frequently does about as well as any other encyclopae- 
dia!3 – but we are never certain that it has done so in a subject we 
ourselves know nothing about. This creates a significant gap in its claim 
to knowledge, when knowledge is understood on the conventional basis 
as justified true belief. Despite its policies of ‘no original research’ and 
‘verifiability’, all sorts of strange and wonderful claims end up creeping 
into its articles, in part because the attention of its editors is never evenly 
distributed. 
 
The editors of the Wikipedia inevitably end up spending their time work- 
ing upon the areas of interest to them, which is quite understandable 
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given that this is voluntary work. Some spend a great deal of time having 
discussions with other editors in good faith about what the pages should 
contain; some spend their time working on pages that are of limited inter- 
est and that no-one else contributes to. Some take an entirely negative 
stance and focus upon bestowing ‘badges of dishonour’ like “This arti- 
cle does not cite any sources” or “This article needs more links to other 
articles to help integrate it into the encyclopaedia” on the articles that do 
not appear to be up to scratch. There’s even a name for the practice of 
dropping such badges without participating in the content discussions: 
‘drive-by tagging’4. 
 
For my own part, I became a Wikipedia editor after watching, for quite 
some time, my own Wikipedia page remain empty. Someone, and I have 
no idea whom (such is usually the case when it comes to the Wikipedia) 
created a page for me in connection with my first non-fiction book, and I 
thus hurdled the site’s ‘notability’ criteria. But years passed, and nobody 
ever came and added any content to that page. I spoke to other people  
in the games industry about the Wikipedia, and was repeatedly informed 
that the easiest thing to do is just to make the edits anonymously and    
be done with it. But I didn’t want to do that. I wanted to respect the 
Wikipedia’s policies, and secretly filling in my own details was clearly 
not permissible. 
 
Then I found a loophole. While editing your own page is an infringement 
of the Wikipedia’s guidelines on ‘neutral voice’ and ‘conflict of interest’, 
it is not specifically forbidden. So I created an account in my own name, 
made my ‘talk’ page correspond to my own entry in the Wikipedia (so 
that I would be publically identifiable in connection with my edits), 
added the content that I had drafted, explained what I had done and why 
on the talk page – and then waited. Sure enough, the article was soon 
after tagged as ‘Conflict of Interest’ by another editor, who came to my 
page assuming malfeasance. However, I had a good and productive dis- 
cussion with that editor, which ended amicably with the agreement that, 
since no-one else cared about the page, it was just as well that I had 
attempted to buff up its content. Later that year, I replaced the   original 
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‘badge of shame’ with one stating ‘Autobiography’. Somebody took it 
down at one point, but it was back up again soon after, and remained in 
place right up to the point that a cabal of elite Wikipedia editors elected 
to delete my page entirely. 
 
If it seems strange that I am not permitted (without a ‘scarlet letter’, at 
least) to be a reliable source upon myself for the Wikipedia, it is worth 
reflecting that no traditional encyclopaedia would ever let someone write 
an entry upon themselves, since bias would be assumed in such a case, 
and that would be taken to undermine any claim to knowledge. In this 
regard, the fact that it is at least possible on the Wikipedia to do so is     
a sign that it might be doing something more than being ‘just’ an ency- 
clopaedia, a point that we will have to return to at a later juncture. For 
now, we must reflect upon the strangely disconnected quality of the dis- 
course lying behind the contents of Wikipedia articles. 
 
For many articles (but not all – recall my own page), there are a com- 
munity of diligent nerds working behind the scenes to try and uphold the 
Wikipedia’s policies and provide text that both captures the truth, and 
attempts to justify it with reliable sources. This community is honourably 
striving to meet Plato’s requirement for knowledge by presenting justi- 
fied true belief, to the extent that some pages are tagged as deficient pre- 
cisely because of a lack of expert testimony among the cited sources. But 
try as we might, the editors of the Wikipedia can never quite manage to 
fully bear the burden of knowledge in the conventional sense… we may 
be able to assure ourselves that we have found a suitable justification for 
a claim, but we can never insure that content in a way that gives anyone 
looking at one of its articles the requisite confidence in its justifications. 
 
Even when Wikipedia provides correct information we cannot know it 
has done so, and thus can possess no justification for claiming that we 
do. I say this as both a user and an editor of the Wikipedia, and as some- 
one who appreciates both its remarkable virtue as a public database, and 
the incredible efforts expended in the maintenance of that data. It is not 
this particular resource that I am trying to bring into question here,   but 
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the very idea of databases as a means of knowing. Knowledge, whatever 
it might be, becomes tainted with doubts when it is compiled using the 
kinds of techniques that lie behind the Wikipedia – and this in turn raises 
interesting questions about all our knowledge. 
 
Factual Knowledge 
 
What does it mean to say you have knowledge of something? Either that 
you know the facts, or that you know how to do something. In some 
cases that you know the facts, because you know how to do   something 
– the practical skills of mechanics give them many of the facts about 
engine maintenance, for instance. But in what sense does merely remem- 
bering a fact constitute knowledge? 
 
By ‘facts’ we mean those things that are known to be true – irrespective 
of how this is ascertained or justified. This wider question of justification 
was precisely what led me to suggest that the Wikipedia knows nothing, 
based on the usual construal of knowledge as justified true belief. Yet 
knowing a fact does not mean we are able to reproduce the conditions 
by which it is known to be true; this would be rather difficult in many 
cases. How exactly would you demonstrate that it was true that the city 
of Constantinople fell in 1453 AD, or for that matter that the city of 
Istanbul was captured in 857 AH? Knowing the facts by themselves usu- 
ally means little more than remembering something that you heard was 
true, and continuing to assert it as true. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the school of philosophy that 
was soon to be termed ‘analytic’ was keenly focussed on logic, since 
this was the aspect of philosophy and mathematics that dealt with truth, 
which was taken to be fundamental largely on the basis of Plato’s work. 
Bertrand Russell’s concept of logical atomism, first expounded in 1911, 
but later influenced by the early work of his pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
was based on the idea that the world could be understood as being com- 
prised of facts, about which we could have beliefs that would be (logi- 
cally) true or false5. The relationship with Plato’s thought is clear, and 
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logical atomism in effect shored up the construal of knowledge as justi- 
fied true belief, already discussed. 
A key text in respect of early twentieth century ideas of knowledge is 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus6. It influenced Russell’s 
later work on logical atomism, and inspired a group known as ‘the 
Vienna circle’ into a project of elevating the sciences above all other 
ways of knowing, which I have criticised elsewhere7. But Wittgenstein 
himself seems to have been rather horrified by the direction his work was 
taken, and it seems clear he himself had not intended his philosophy to 
be used this way. Not only was he thoroughly unsatisfied with his men- 
tor’s introduction to the Tractatus8, but on the few occasions he inter- 
acted with the Vienna circle he found their misunderstanding of his work 
to be so painful that he turned his chair to the wall and began reading 
the work of a renowned Bengali poet aloud rather than talk to them9. 
It seems that Wittgenstein’s own view of his early philosophy was as an 
attempt to lay out the limitations of conventional philosophy, and to elu- 
cidate the mistakes that philosophers are apt to make by building theories 
to address problems that are at root problems of language. His claim in 
proposition 1.1 of the Tractatus that “the world is the totality of facts”10, 
and similarly in proposition 4.01 that “a proposition is a picture of real- 
ity”11, were thus not meant to endorse the stated ideas (as Russell and 
the Vienna circle did) but to explore the problems that would follow from 
doing so. The implications of this have still not been taken entirely seri- 
ously by the tradition of analytic philosophy set in motion at this junc- 
ture, and Wittgenstein spent the rest of his career trying to undermine 
what he had inadvertently set in motion. 
 
The final line of the Tractatus states: “About what one can not speak, 
one must remain silent.”12 To the Vienna circle this was a call to arms  
to flatly reject what philosophers call metaphysics, the untestable suppo- 
sitions and presuppositions of thought and being, which form systems I 
call mythologies or mythos13. For these early twentieth century thinkers, 
inspired by Wittgenstein, such matters were to be dismissed as nonsense. 
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For Wittgenstein himself, the spiritual ideas, moral convictions, and eth- 
ical values that could not be tested were far from worthless: they were 
the most important concerns in life14. His point about remaining silent 
about them was not intended to be a dismissal, but a recognition of the 
limits of philosophy as it was then understood. 
 
Regardless of Wittgenstein’s own views on the Tractatus, a great many 
people would support his proposition that “the world is the totality of 
facts”, at least in principle. To have the facts is thus to have knowledge of 
the world, and some subset of all the facts that might be asserted consti- 
tute what is called in English ‘general knowledge’. While any catalogue 
of general knowledge might contain any number of different facts, for 
every cultural context the truth of the vast majority of the propositions in 
circulation is not really in doubt. 
 
Factual knowledge is thus cultural knowledge, a point that comes out 
clearly in French and Spanish which render the concept as culture 
générale or cultura general. The fact that Everest is the tallest mountain 
in the world is certainly a part of the general knowledge of Great Britain, 
whose colonial surveyors measured it and named it thus; it might also  
be true in Nepal that Sagarmāthā is the tallest mountain in the world, or 
true of Chomolungma in Tibet, but anyone in English who replied that 
Chomolungma was the tallest mountain in the world would need to pro- 
vide the additional explanation to demonstrate that this fact still accorded 
with general knowledge. 
 
Factual knowledge like this is precisely what an encyclopaedia aims to 
collect and present, as indeed is also the case for an almanac. In such 
cases, we trust in the authority of the people who have compiled the ref- 
erence book or database when we take the propositions they contain as 
facts. That trust is part of our justification for accepting them as true;    
it is why our belief in it is considered justified. But in each such case, 
the production of the fact itself – the height of a mountain above sea- 
level, for instance, or the history of a city – involved the application of 
very specific skills. Every fact was derived by a practice, or a collection 
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of practices: geometry and the use of a theodolite provided the height   
of Everest; calendars, record-making, and the interpretation of records 
provide the history of the city at the mouth of the Bosphorus alluded to 
above. 
 
This being so, it would seem as if there are not two kinds of knowledge 
at all, since factual knowledge rests at its core upon practical skills. It   
is these practices that have the authentic claim to knowledge – knowing 
‘the facts’ without the practices that underlie them is only trusting that 
you are connected by a chain of reliable witnesses to those who do pos- 
sess the relevant skills. Furthermore, the extent to which we truly share 
in the knowledge being conveyed in such a way will always be limited 
by the extent we understand the relevant practices. If the world is under- 
stood solely as the totality of facts, we will miss the more important 
point that being in the world involves far more than mere facts, which 
are merely the residue of the skills that provided them. Factual knowl- 
edge is nothing but repeating. 
 
Knowledge as a Practice 
 
The break with the conventional conceptions of knowledge implied by 
the preceding discussion is significant enough that it is quite possible I 
have failed to make the idea sink in with sufficient force to dislodge our 
engrained habits of thought. For despite knowledge usually being under- 
stood either as the recall of facts, or as the application of skills, I am sug- 
gesting that every fact was produced by a practical skill, or a cluster of 
such skills. This proposal reduces factual knowledge to mere repetition, 
and suggests that all knowledge can be understood as a practice. This, 
not coincidentally, aligns with what Wittgenstein attempted to demon- 
strate in his later philosophy: that our languages and propositions could 
only be understood against a background of understanding, and that at 
the core of our being in the world is the notion of a practice15. 
 
The idea that factual knowledge is merely repetition also means that   
my case that the Wikipedia knows nothing is even stronger than first 
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suggested: not only are there questions about justifying any claim that 
was taken solely from a wiki, but any mere database can only collect 
facts and cannot adequately provide skills. Indeed, no encyclopaedia     
is a source of knowledge since facts are not in themselves knowledge. 
That said, Wikipedia editors do possess knowledge: the practices of the 
Wikipedia itself. These are methods for composing texts that will possess 
justified true belief, i.e. for repeating factual knowledge. There is a skill 
here – although it should be clear that the practice in question is always 
different from the knowledge that the Wikipedia articles are claiming to 
present, which belongs solely to the people whose work produces the 
‘reliable sources’ being referenced. 
 
This way of understanding knowledge as a practice completely replaces 
the scheme of philosophical thought concerning knowledge that orig- 
inated with Plato, namely that it can be understood as justified true 
belief. This principle alleges to be a means of explaining why a fact con- 
stitutes knowledge: my counterpoint is that all facts are merely a residue 
of the knowledge that produces them, and are not in themselves knowl- 
edge, as such. A proposition that can be said to constitute a fact does 
indeed attain that status via justified true belief – Plato’s scheme is not 
incorrect, it is just misleading. It suggests knowledge is a question of the 
validity of beliefs. But the important point is not ‘true belief’, but justifi- 
cation: knowledge is that which can provide a justification. 
The clearest cases can be found in considering the sciences, although we 
should not construe from this that the only knowledge-practices are sci- 
entific. Consider, as a starting point, Einstein’s famous energy-mass rela- 
tionship16. If you know that E=mc2, you do not have knowledge unless 
you possess at least one of the practices that relate to this formula and 
its derivation. For instance, I have some basic knowledge of Einstein’s 
mass-energy equivalence because I can derive the formula in question 
from a simple thought experiment using Newton’s equations of motion.  
I have some mathematical knowledge about this subject. There is much 
more than maths entailed in providing the justification for the equation, 
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however. The equation was merely an idea in Einstein’s head until its 
implications were experimentally verified. 
In 1932, John Cockcroft and Ernest Walton bombarded lithium with pro- 
tons and produced data that is widely taken to prove mass-energy equiva- 
lence17. Curiously, however, they were not testing this: they were merely 
testing the hypothesis that the lithium atoms would disintegrate into two 
alpha particles when struck with protons. Here is an odd case: the evi- 
dence produced as proof for special relativity’s most famous formula 
came from a special practice, that of the design of a voltage multiplier  
to use with a discharge tube, intended for another purpose entirely. Who 
has knowledge in such a case? 
 
I find it helpful to deploy the conception of the sciences developed by 
Isabelle Stengers, that successful scientists learn how to make inanimate 
objects form reliable witnesses18. Cockcroft and Walton’s experimental 
practices made lithium atoms into a reliable witness. Bruno Latour adds 
to this idea the concept of a spokesperson19: Cockcroft and Walton were 
spokespeople for lithium atoms after their experiment. Using these terms 
we can see that anyone who understands the mathematics of special rel- 
ativity has knowledge of physics that involves recruiting Cockcroft and 
Walton and lithium atoms in a chain of reliable witnesses. In an odd yet 
perfectly understandable way, their practices regarding electrical equip- 
ment form part of the knowledge of mass-energy equivalence, broadly 
construed. 
 
What this example illuminates is that when we conceive of knowledge 
as a practice, that knowledge is rarely if ever the result of individual 
capabilities. Knowledge is sustained by networks of practices, chains of 
reliable witnesses (especially in the sciences) or lineages of techniques 
(especially in the arts) that distribute what we can be said to know 
between all those whose practices contribute to that knowledge. Fre- 
quently, we cannot even adequately elucidate everyone thus entailed: if 
we look  at  a contemporary  painting influenced  by impressionism, we 
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may be able to name impressionist painters, but what of the practices that 
made the oil paints, the canvases, the paint brushes? 
 
Knowledge is not just a practice, it is created and sustained by networks 
of practice that cut across history. Facts are merely the residue of these 
networks, and remembering them is not having access to the knowledge 
behind them. And yet, the act of remembering is in itself a kind of prac- 
tice – especially in subjects such as history, where the facts are connected 
by causal relations and influences that must be carefully distinguished. 
Perhaps, then, the facts can still constitute knowledge – provided there  
is a practice involved in their relation. But we should give up the idea 
that to know is to repeat propositions that are both true and justified      
as being so: isolated claims mean nothing. To possess knowledge, we 
must engage in practices – our own, and those of others too numerous to 
count. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Plato (369 BC), Theaetetus. 
2. Okuda, Michael and Okuda, Michelle (1999). The Star Trek Encyclopaedia: 
A Reference Guide to the Future (Revised and Expanded Edition), New York, 
NY: Pocket Books. 
3. Giles, Jim (2005). "Special Report: Internet encyclopaedias go head to head", 
Nature, Vol. 438 (December), pp900-901. 
4. Wikipedia Project Page (no date). "Wikipedia: Tagging Pages For Problems", 
available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wikipedia:Tagging_pages_for_problems (accessed 9th March 2016). 
5. Monk, Ray and Anthony Palmer (1996). Bertrand Russell and the Origins of 
Analytical Philosophy, Bristol: Thoemmes. 
6. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by 
Frank P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden [1922] London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trub- 
ner, available online: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf 
(accessed 9th March 2016). 
7. Bateman, Chris (2012). The Mythology of Evolution, Winchester and Wash- 
ington: Zero Books, section "Popper's Milestone", pp19-23; Bateman, Chris 
(2014). Chaos Ethics, Winchester and Chicago: Zero Books, section "The 
Vienna Wall", pp70-77. 
What Does Wikipedia Know?  13 
 
 
8. Monk, Ray (2005). How To Read Wittgenstein, London: Granta Books, 
p32-33. 
9. Bhattacharya, Ananyo (2012). "The Limits of Science–and Scientists", Dis- 
cover Magazine, available online: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/ 
2012/09/07/the-limits-of-science-and-scientists/#.VtqkM6GNA1J (accessed 
9th March 2016). 
10. Wittgenstein (1921), p25. 
11. Ibid, p38. 
12. Ibid, p90. 
13. Bateman (2012). 
14. Bhattacharya (2012). 
15. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations, translated by 
G.E.M. Anscombe [1962], New York, NY: Macmillan; Lamarque, Peter 
(2010). "Wittgenstein, Literature, and the Idea of a Practice" British Journal 
of Aesthetics vol. 50, no. 4, pp375-388. 
16. Einstein, Albert (1905). "Does the Inertia of a Body Depend Upon Its 
Energy-content?", translated by W. Perrett and G.B. Jeffery [1922], available 
online: http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/einstein/E_mc2/www/ (accessed 9th 
March 2016). 
17. Cockcroft, John D. and Walton Ernest T.S. (1932). "Experiments with High 
Velocity Positive Ions - (I) Further Developments in the Method of Obtaining 
High Velocity Positive Ions", Proceedings of the Royal Society, Vol. 136, 
pp619–630; Cockcroft, John D. and Walton Ernest T.S. (1932). "Experiments 
with High Velocity Positive Ions - (II) The Disintegration of Elements by 
High Velocity Protons, Proceedings of the Royal Society, Vol. 137, pp229–
242. 
18. Stengers, Isabelle (1997). Power and Invention: Situating Science, Min- 
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
19. Latour, Bruno (1999). Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy, translated by Catherine Porter [2004], Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
  
2 
 
How Many Real Worlds Are There? 
 
 
 
 
A premise of modern thought is that there is only one real world, and that 
knowledge can be equated to access to this singular real world. Against 
this are various forms of relativism that would claim that knowledge is 
always contingent upon circumstances, and thus there are no worlds that 
could justifiably be called real. But there is a third option between the 
two: there could be many real worlds. 
I need to be clear that these many real worlds are not the ones that 
physicists call a multiverse, having borrowed the term from novelist 
Michael Moorcock1. In the physicist’s multiverse there is one real world 
and many possible worlds. What I’m talking about here is what William 
James called a multiverse2, half a century before Moorcock: that rather 
than a universe, an ‘all-form’ of reality, our existence is better under- 
stood as comprised of multiple ‘each-forms’. It is an idea that I have 
developed, using both James’ and Moorcock’s work, as a way of under- 
standing our common existence and addressing our ethical disputes with- 
out treating morality as fundamentally ‘unreal’3. We live in the same 
multiverse, but there are many real worlds that comprise it. 
 
Immediately we hit an impasse, because our very notion of ‘real’ gives 
us reasons to expect one and only one real world. We are, to use Wittgen- 
stein’s phrase, held captive by a picture4. In particular, if what we think 
of as ‘the real world’ is a gigantic, universe-sized box full of vacuum 
and atoms, it can be hard to see how there could be more than one real 
world. But even if there were only one real world, it could not possibly 
be like this image of space and matter; the physicists of the early twenti- 
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eth century showed that extension was not absolute, but relative, and that 
existence was about which possibilities occur. Relativity and quantum 
mechanics call for a new understanding of the physical universe, since 
our current model descends from the era of Newton and begins to seem 
implausible. We must look again at what we mean by ‘real’. 
Consider, as a stepping point, what happens if we replace the idea of     
a box of matter as the basis for what exists with the idea of a set of 
events and their relations. This is a concept that comes from Alfred 
North Whitehead’s wrestling with the philosophical consequences of 
early twentieth century physics5. What immediately comes into play is  
a capacity to distinguish relationships between specific events from rela- 
tionships that will apply to all events of a particular kind. To say what 
happens when we burn wood (the general claim) is different from talk- 
ing about a particular tree that burns after a lightning strike (a specific 
claim). Our sense here is still of regularities: the general claims constrain 
the specific claims; the relationships between events behave in an orderly 
fashion. We can see immediately that we do not need the box of matter 
idea to conduct empirical research. The web of events can serve the same 
role. 
 
Now imagine a confrontation between two alien races who have different 
images for existence along these lines. The Boxers look at the universe 
as a vast container of atoms, while the Eventers see it as a network of 
events. Both species find that their equivalent to scientists can, all other 
matters being equal, make accurate predictions wherever their theoreti- 
cal models are strong – yet the actual models might be quite different in 
their concepts and terms. We would still expect that, where a mathemati- 
cal model could be produced, that the numbers would come out the same 
for both species, but the kind of things either is thinking about would still 
be radically different. 
 
The conventional way of explaining this situation is that the subjective 
worlds of the Boxers and Eventers ‘track the truth’ of the objective 
world. The objective world here is essentially a superset, within   which 
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all subjective worlds are nested (as dependent upon the objective world 
for their existence). This objective world is a comfortable concept for the 
Boxers, because it equates to there only being one ‘true’ configuration 
of the atoms in the universe. You could focus on some smaller region in 
space and time, but the Laws of the box would remain the same. 
 
However, what is the objective world to the Eventers? The superset of 
all events is not a single object like the universe-box, because each event 
is in itself a cluster of events, as encountered by anything else according 
to its own unique conditions for its existence. There are, in fact, many 
different ways of understanding the sets of events, and hence many true 
configurations of events. Indeed, it is possible to ‘stitch together’ a com- 
pletely consistent tapestry of events that includes all the space and time 
within the Boxer’s universe and still have a vast reserve of consistent 
event-sets ‘left over’. Eventers are not so likely to talk about ‘an objec- 
tive world’ at all: they are far more likely to recognise that there are 
‘objective worlds’ for every conceivable kind of entity. 
 
This shows just one way of understanding the idea of multiple real 
worlds. The key point is that what makes one singular real world seem 
plausible is the image of a box to be filled in; of knowledge as a jigsaw to 
be completed, piece by piece. The image of a network of events instead 
suggests different possible ‘stitches’ between sets of events, and patterns 
between events that depend upon the particular focus in each case. The 
view attributed here to the Boxers is how we talk about the work of the 
sciences, but the view attributed to the Eventers better describes what 
scientists actually do. This is a point made, in different ways, by White- 
head, Bruno Latour, and Isabelle Stengers, and its implications take some 
pondering. 
 
What the Boxer-view gives us is a reason for faith in the processes of 
the sciences being capable of rendering reliable witnesses out of the dif- 
ferent entities we encounter – it helps us understand the motive behind 
the work of all scientific researchers, namely to allow inanimate objects 
to ‘bear witness’, and to find ways to assure the reliability of their  ‘tes- 
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timony’. It reflects the truth of the idea that what happened could be 
definitively settled once it has occurred. There is a way to put everything 
together coherently – but we always have to bear in mind that we don’t 
ever actually have a grasp of this coherent totality, and could never know 
we had even if we did! 
What the Eventer-view gives us is a better understanding of why sci- 
entists are able to produce reliable witnesses – it brings into focus the 
tremendous work of not only establishing what to examine, but devising 
methods of translating the observed events such that they can secure this 
reliability in the eyes of anyone who cares to join the investigation. As 
Stengers notes, when we talk about what is ‘objective’, we are referring 
to the questions that can be answered reliably by a certain experimen- 
tal apparatus, which then open up new questions6. Understood this way, 
there is no need to invoke an ‘objective world’ to explain the work of the 
sciences: they are objective precisely because they are concerned with 
objects and the difficult challenges involved in making them ‘talk’ reli- 
ably. 
 
However, the Eventer-view also hints that scientists might not possess 
the only skills capable of producing reliable witnesses. In many cases 
– electrons, distant galaxies, DNA – scientists and their tools have the 
best chances of producing an adequate translation. But when it comes to, 
say, living in the Amazon rainforest, methods of observation must share 
the stage with the practices of living, which can bear upon a real world 
without that world having to be that of the Boxer-view – nor necessar- 
ily contradicting the state of perfect knowledge that image implies. Even 
a monkey who lives in the rainforest knows more of the relationships 
between its events than can reasonably be dismissed as ‘not real’, even 
though their knowledge in that regard might be limited. 
 
The picture that holds us captive becomes visible when we imagine what 
is real and comprehend it as a single consistent arrangement of matter, 
and a single consistent set of propositions that accord with it. But rel- 
ativity and quantum mechanics don’t suggest this kind of  configuration 
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for the physical elements of existence, and perhaps more importantly 
our intense focus on real distract us from the fact that this singular real 
world is imagined. It is precisely because it is imagined that a plurality 
of worlds need not contradict the inviolability of events: once we see that 
worlds are situated in their conditions, and cannot easily be totalised (and 
certainly not by imagining matter as a basis for doing so), it makes less 
sense to be talking about a singular world as the locus of the real. The 
real always exceeds us, no matter who or what we are, a point made in a 
rather different fashion by Alain Badiou7. 
It is because of this excess that reality possesses, and because our vision 
of a universe can only ever be an imagined unity, that we ought to be 
more cautious than we are about letting this idea guide our thoughts. 
Mary Midgley makes the point that what we call ‘the real world’ is the 
totality of existence and is at best, as Immanuel Kant suggested, a nec- 
essary element of our thinking processes – it is not the name of some- 
thing we can directly encounter8. Furthermore, she points out that if we 
have understood the way the sciences work, we must appreciate  that  
the different kinds of questions we ask will result in different kinds of 
answer. They must be compatible (the Boxer view must always be possi- 
ble to imagine) but different ‘stitches’ between events can create impres- 
sions that seem incompatible. She uses the example of a Swiss roll (or 
jelly roll): sliced downwards, you find a spiral; slice lengthwise, you see 
stripes. You cannot reduce stripes to spirals or vice versa, yet these pat- 
terns can be related once their relationships have been properly under- 
stood9. 
 
If there was only one real world, we would have to conclude that no- 
one could actually know it, although they might be inspired by the pos- 
sibility of something eventually knowing it. If there was no real world, 
even the possibility of knowing would be extinguished. But from a per- 
spective grounded upon events or processes, everyone (everything!) can 
know something of the real without anyone ever possessing the whole  
of it. This is why we will find multiple real worlds if we look closely   
at what actually happens rather than focussing on the question of how 
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all witnesses can be made to tally with a hypothetical ideal universe of 
knowledge. Of course, from any one single perspective, it can still be 
tricky to ascertain which aspects of your world are real and which are 
otherwise without seeking reliable witnesses, of any kind. But this ambi- 
guity doesn’t detract from the reality of each world, nor should it. There 
is no universe, and never was. The fact of our living together in our dif- 
ferent worlds should have made it clear that it was always a multiverse. 
 
The Subjective Knowledge of Squirrels 
 
If you startle a grey squirrel who is foraging on the ground, they will 
immediately dash towards the nearest tree, run up and around it until 
they cannot be seen by you, then climb upwards as much as needed to in 
order to feel somewhat safe. If you pursue the squirrel, they will shoot up 
the tree, along the branches, and head for the point in the foliage of the 
canopy where another tree overlaps, or is at least fairly close by. When 
the neighbouring trees do not touch, the squirrel who is avoiding your 
unwanted attention will leap from its original tree across to a branch on 
the next one – sometimes arriving on nothing more than a twig, which 
may bend worryingly downwards under its weight. The squirrel, while 
visibly perturbed by such an event, quickly clambers to the secure foot- 
ing on the other tree and can be gone from your sight before you even 
noticed it was there. 
Now the squirrel’s capacity to negotiate trees not only exceeds our own, 
but their knowledge of trees and their surfaces exceeds even our ability 
to conceptualise an adequate parallel. Next to this arboreal labyrinth, our 
flat pathways and roads are positively dull exercises in trivial navigation, 
while the world of the tree squirrels is one of possibilities and intersec- 
tions along fractal routes they can traverse with consummate skill. It is 
something that we can only barely imagine: like Thomas Nagel deny- 
ing we could know what it is like to be a bat10, the squirrels’ experience 
of trees is fundamentally barred to us. We  would not, it is clear,  want  
to describe the sure and certain agility of squirrels as being objective 
knowledge, no matter how assuredly they traverse it. Yet if the  capabil- 
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ities of squirrels are to be understood as subjective knowledge, we are 
forced to admit that such knowledge can be every bit as reliable as what 
is produced by the sciences – and a damn sight more applicable to every- 
day life! 
 
Suppose we understand objective knowledge in the manner proposed by 
Isabelle Stengers, as something produced through the painstaking cre- 
ation of methods of investigation. When scientists manage to produce 
something that can resist all objections, it forms a reliable witness on 
some rather narrow topic. Objective knowledge necessarily tends 
towards this kind of partial quality, and would not by itself be a plausible 
way of being part of any world: someone who solely understood gravity, 
quantum mechanics, organic chemistry, and cell mitosis would be thor- 
oughly ill-equipped for life. Such a narrow field of vision inevitably fol- 
lows from the complex compositions of things that must be coaxed into 
developing an objectivity for those who are working with them. 
 
Accepting the myopic quality of our various and impressive scientific 
apparatus makes the contrast between objective and subjective knowl- 
edge feel rather claustrophobic… the vast majority of knowledge lacks 
this quality of objectivity, of belonging to networks of objects that give a 
voice to something that cannot speak without us. Yet these other, subjec- 
tive knowledges, while lacking the robustness of their artificially created 
cousins, are still capable of being reliable witnesses too. We can trust a 
builder to know how to construct a house, a mechanic to know how to 
repair an engine, a chef to know how to bake a soufflé, an artist to know 
how to blend paint to make a certain hue, or a musician to know how to 
harmonise. Likewise, we can trust a squirrel to climb a tree. 
 
We have all been inculcated into an understanding that subjective knowl- 
edge is unreliable, a situation that comes out of contrasting it with objec- 
tive knowledge, which is deemed reliable, essentially by definition. We 
should not trust our own judgements as they are merely subjective, but 
we should trust what is reported by scientists as this is objective fact. 
(We’ll get to facts in a moment). But if reliability is our purpose, sub- 
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jective knowledge is just as capable of producing it as its cousin, and 
furthermore the methods that produce objective knowledge are just as 
capable of error as anything else. Aligning objectivity with reliability, 
and subjectivity with error, is to simultaneously misunderstand the core 
qualities of skilful practices while artificially canonising scientific tech- 
niques with an unwarranted infallibility that is thoroughly undeserved. 
As Hilary Putnam was keen to note: “No sane person should believe  
that something is ‘subjective’ merely because it cannot be settled beyond 
controversy.”11 
This dichotomy between the subjective and the objective has been 
handed down to us over nearly four centuries from original ideas in 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in 1641, 
which imagined a thinking subject (“I”) and contrasts it to the world    
of extension and matter it is situated within. Mind is thus contrasted to 
matter in Descartes proposal, and the fingerprints of this Cartesian dual- 
ism are found everywhere today, as Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Tay-  
lor observe, even among people who claim to repudiate Descartes12. For 
instance, those who turn against the dualism of mind and matter that 
was core to Descartes’ account often do so by deflating the significance 
of mind, thus raising matter to centre stage by suggesting mind sim-   
ply emerges from the action of matter. Such materialist apples have not 
fallen far from their dualist tree. But then, as Allen Wood suggests, when 
it comes to philosophy of mind, we are all ‘recovering Cartesians’13. 
 
Drawing against the work of the two pivotal figures of twentieth century 
philosophy, Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dreyfus and 
Taylor offer an alternative understanding of our relationship with the 
world – one that is not based upon our being trapped inside the discon- 
nected mind implied by the famous image of a brain-in-a-vat. They pro- 
pose instead that we should understand ourselves as in contact with the 
world we live within. Rather than our minds forming images of an ‘out- 
side’ world that they are forever separated from (the Cartesian mythos 
of mind versus matter) they suggest that we have a direct encounter 
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with reality that utterly straddles the supposed divided into subject and 
object14. 
This contact theory (as they term it) is strongly rooted to Heidegger’s 
idea of being-in-the-world15, and leads to a sense that at the base of 
those experiences what we usually term ‘subjective’ is a co-production 
between a being and the reality it lives within. It certainly counts in 
favour of this view that it aligns with work in numerous scientific fields, 
including cognitive science, neurobiology, and artificial intelligence, all 
of which are drawing away from Descartes and towards Heidegger’s per- 
spective under umbrella terms such as ’embodied cognition’ and ‘enac- 
tivism’. Our minds, in the contact view, are engaged in transactions with 
reality at the centre of which can be found not just our brains but our 
entire bodies. Hence the phrase ’embodied cognition’: our minds are not 
just in our heads, they are in our worlds. 
 
Accepting my understanding of knowledge as a practice, we can see that 
the kind of subjective knowledges I have suggested here i.e. building, 
repairing, baking, painting, harmonising – not to mention tree climbing 
for squirrels – are genuine knowledge practices. They have the reliabil- 
ity that is the sign of knowledge, they produce facts as a side-effect of 
this reliability, and they are sustained by networks of practitioners. Hav- 
ing come this far down this line of approach, it begins to seem as if the 
adjective ‘subjective’ has become empty and vacuous: the knowledge of 
beings is knowledge. Objective knowledge – the knowledge teased from 
objects – is just a special case of knowledge, not its paradigm case. 
If this leads us to a conclusion that feels surprising, or even alien, this   
is only because we are unaccustomed to recognising knowledge as a 
practice, and even less comfortable with admitting that other animals 
can possess knowledge. Still, the squirrels’ adroitness with trees must be 
understood this way if we are honest about their capabilities. Dreyfus 
and Taylor suggest that blind spots like these come about because we 
treat subjective experience as if it were a picture generated internally of 
an external world16 – the Boxer picture of reality I rejected as incom- 
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plete on different but parallel grounds above. When we think this way, 
we are ignoring all the intricate perceptual practices of our living body 
that Maurice Merleau-Ponty drew attention to17. Just seeing an object 
clearly is a knowledge-practice: we routinely underestimate the skill we 
possess in such matters, which requires us to pick out an object in a clut- 
tered visual field, bring it into focus, and often to move our body to gain 
an optimal vantage point. 
 
One objection may spring to mind: that rather than ‘knowledge’, we 
should understand the squirrel’s competence as instinct. But this is to 
make another of Descartes’ errors – to think of animals as mere 
machines, and thus ignore the way that beings other than humans also 
possess minds that influence their existence in the short term and, via the 
chain of inheritance and persistence of advantages, alter their biology in 
the long term. In this regard, I call to the witness stand the humble rock 
squirrel, a denizen of the desert plains of Mexico and the south-western 
United States, whose primary interest to us is their biological similarity 
to the grey squirrel I recruited as an example above. Despite the rock 
squirrel being about fifty percent bigger and heavier, the overall physi- 
ologies of the two species are notably parallel. 
 
Rock squirrels are perfectly capable of climbing trees, but they seldom 
do so because they live in arid flatlands. Instead, their elongated claws 
(which are what help the grey squirrel with its arboreal escapades) are 
used for digging burrows. The same biological blessing – claws – sup- 
ports two very different worlds, the climbing world of the tree squir- 
rels and the burrowing world of the ground squirrel. It is not that the 
grey squirrel and the rock squirrel possess radically different instincts 
about how to use their claws – they are biologically similar in every key 
way, and are clearly close relatives. What differs between them are their 
knowledge-practices and the worlds that these lead to, or – equivalently 
– the worlds they live in and the knowledge practices that these lead to. It 
is the grey squirrels’ life in and around trees that gives them their compe- 
tences, just as it is a life around rocks that give their cousins theirs. These 
lives and worlds are not fixed by biology, awaiting a chance mutation 
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like a miracle from heaven; there is always a new world to be discovered 
when you leave the trees for the ground, or vice versa. 
Knowledge-practices belong to the worlds they are embedded within – 
that they are embodied within – and to share a knowledge-practice is to 
share a world. Grey squirrels live with trees, and trees are as much a part 
of their world as cars, roads, and shoes are to us. Rock squirrels live in 
yet another world, with different knowledge-practices that belong to that 
world. Dreyfus and Taylor, developing arguments that parallel mine but 
proceed upon a thoroughly different line of attack, conclude their inves- 
tigations by suggesting that realism must be connected to the worlds we 
are embodied within. Since there are multiple ways to describe nature, 
any or all of which could possess truth, the only viable realism available 
to us is what they call a plural realism18. They took a different path, but 
one that still ends in what I have called, following both Michael Moor- 
cock and William James, a multiverse. We live in different worlds, we 
practice different knowledges, but all of us – including the squirrels – 
live in the same multiverse. 
 
The Seduction of Facts 
 
There remains one thorny and dangerous subject in connection with this 
idea of a multiverse we all live in, namely the matter of facts. We all, 
one way or another, have a love for facts of at least some particular kind, 
if not for facts of all kinds. Indeed, there is an entire genre of games 
dedicated to our ability to recall them, aptly entitled ‘trivia contests’ in 
English. Setting this form up in a box led to one of the most successful 
boardgames of all time, Trivial Pursuit, while dramatising the agonising 
uncertainties in the face of such questions gave rise to one of the most 
successful TV game shows of all time, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? 
Clearly, we love facts. So what could be dangerous about them? 
 
I have already made the case that understanding facts as knowledge is 
misleading since all facts are the residue of the practices that produced 
and justified them, and further that it is better to understand  knowledge 
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as a practice, or rather, a collection of practices. Nothing in this arrange- 
ment  gives us reasons to  be suspicious  of facts, since all  I’ve done    
is change the context for understanding what a fact is, and cast doubt 
that someone who can repeat facts (who has ‘general knowledge’) is 
genuinely in possession of something that could be justifiably termed 
‘knowledge’. Yet there is something significantly misleading about our 
love of facts whenever it emerges in a political context: facts are invoked 
as a means of ending discussion, and this is toxic to politics. 
The problem is so subtle it would be easy to miss it, and rests with the 
way we have constructed the relationship between politics and the sci- 
ences, a topic repeatedly explored by Bruno Latour19. Democratic pol- 
itics, in the sense of the political practices of the ancient Greeks, was 
about every citizen having a chance to be heard and decisions being 
made in a manner that renders everyone equal. Contemporary democ- 
racy, needless to say, offers neither of these things. We vote for a rep- 
resentative based upon geographical criteria, and every citizen has the 
opportunity to speak, but only the famous or those accredited as experts 
have a chance to be heard, since we have largely eliminated public 
debate and replaced it with the circus of the abnormal we call ‘news’. 
 
What facts offer to contemporary government is a means of circumvent- 
ing politics, because where ‘the facts are known’ there is no need for 
discussion – or so the standing policy goes. This is a tremendously con- 
venient state of affairs for politicians, because they do not need to engage 
in politics at all (at least, not with the electorate) whenever they have a 
convenient fact at hand to short circuit any discussions. To make mat- 
ters worse, those in opposition feel compelled to act as if politics were 
only a matter of establishing the correct facts, and not about discussing 
the meaning of those facts, let alone taking into account the practices 
involved in producing facts in the first place. 
 
Facts are seductive because they remove the need to think, or to talk, 
about anything. The policy conflicts over climate change circumvent any 
actual political discussion since it has been reduced to a simple ‘battle 
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for the facts’: either human activity has tangibly affected the global cli- 
mate (fact!) or climate researchers have misrepresented the data (fact!). 
It’s facts versus facts in the arena of public derision, and nobody seems to 
be quite aware how the focus on ‘which facts are true’ removes any pro- 
ductive discussion on the topic. We have successfully managed to turn 
politics into a game show, a sport – and the news, in its commitment to 
ignoring the familiar and reporting only the unusual, facilitates this nar- 
rowing of vision. 
 
As someone who feels very strongly about our worrying relationship to 
our own world, I’ve spent a decade watching on in horror as ‘climate 
change’ replaces ‘global warming’ as a means of reinforcing a partisan 
conflict that is hugely effective at blocking any discussion of the prob- 
lems of human exploitation of our planet’s resources. To make climate 
change the issue is to pick out one conflict over the facts and fail to have 
a discussion about the interrelation of dozens of related issues, such as 
fires in Indonesia that only Al Jazeera paid significant attention to, or the 
shocking rate of extinctions in our time, which doesn’t even qualify as 
news any more because it’s all-too-familiar. 
I have suggested that part of this problem comes from continuing to 
think, as Plato did, about a single real world, when the vast range of 
knowledge-practices might better be understood as a multiverse, as many 
real worlds that overlap, or (to use Stengers term) as an ecology of prac- 
tices20. There are always different possible maps, Midgley reminds us, 
and the plurality of knowledge is actually more effective at grasping 
existence than being able to somehow boil it down to a singular reduc- 
tion21. Facts, in this understanding (as the products of objective 
knowledge-practices), are what can be translated between maps, or sta- 
bilised between worlds, whether through the tremendous work of scien- 
tists to produce apparatus that resist objections, or through the deductive 
work of historians, forensic police, and many more practices besides. 
What these disparate practices have in common is only that they work 
with networks of objects and either make them speak or translate   what 
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has been said – this, I’m suggesting (following Stengers) is what we 
should now understand by the term ‘objective’. 
 
Yet the meaning of facts is not objective knowledge, and never can be 
so. That ‘smoking causes cancer’ is not a reason to stop smoking in 
itself; you have to start bringing in moral judgements about death, or life 
expectancy, or perhaps economic judgements about healthcare spend- 
ing before this fact acquires so specific a meaning. These meanings are 
not ‘mere opinions’ that the facts can simply brush aside. The vast open 
spaces of meaning are something we have to negotiate for ourselves, 
both individually and collectively, and this process is utterly separate 
from those practices that give rise to the facts. 
 
Part of this negotiation of meaning is what is, or should be, called poli- 
tics, and we seem to have lost sight of this. In the fervour to recruit facts 
that will short circuit discussions and precipitate actions, discussion and 
debate fall by the wayside. Very convenient for politicians, who alas (like 
the rest of us) are all-too-readily tempted by quicker and easier paths, but 
disastrous for politics itself. The politics of our multiverse require very 
different approaches to those we are used to in part, as Latour suggests, 
because we have a problem bringing the sciences into discourse with pol- 
itics. 
 
A concern may appear here about who and what we might be allowing 
to live alongside us when we accept that we live in a multiverse  and  
not just a universe. Regardless of the ethical standards we use to make 
the judgement, we judge some ways of acting as evil, and even if there 
was a knowledge-practice entailed (such as bombing civilians, whether 
as a terrorist or as a nation-state) we might find it abhorrent and refuse 
to honour it. But if we exclude those people who are acting in these 
ways from being part of our politics, they can have no possible reason to 
change what they are doing and will thus continue doing evil. Diplomacy 
is far harder than violence and precisely the problem with the collision 
between the factual and the political is that diplomacy ceases to be an 
option at all. Worse, our horror at the abominable acts of others becomes 
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our justification for behaving horrifically. Every time we exclude even 
the possibility of conversation, the radical potential for politics to change 
our worlds is lost. 
Facts become weapons in your arsenal as soon as politics is conceived 
of as warfare; an enemy to defeat, rather than fellow citizens with  
whom we are sharing worlds and knowledge practices. This Politics- 
as-war22 blurs the lines between violence, morality, and right, and thus 
destroys all political possibilities entirely if by ‘politics’ we mean the 
discourse that establishes how we will live together23. The fact wielded 
as a weapon forces our fellow citizens to be either ‘with us or against us’ 
– they have no choice but to be either our ally or our enemy. What would 
they be if instead we acknowledged our common residency of a multi- 
verse? 
 
You could be forgiven for thinking that I am against facts, that they don’t 
matter to me, or that I want to make all facts entirely relative. But I am 
actually intensely serious about factual knowledge, for all that I recog- 
nise that it is often, as the phrase ‘trivia’ implies, trivial. It annoys me 
when my son’s picture book mislabels a newt as a lizard, or his book 
about sea creatures has a picture of a red-eared terrapin, which only lives 
in fresh water. They got the facts wrong, and that bothers me, just as it 
would bother any other nerd who has ever edited a Wikipedia page in 
earnest, or written an entry for a paper encyclopaedia. But it bothers me 
far more that we get politics wrong by thinking it is a solely a question 
of establishing the facts. The facts by themselves aren’t enough: we need 
to establish the meaning of the facts. And that is something that cannot 
be done on our behalf; we must do it ourselves, and ideally, we should 
do it together. 
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Can Experts Make Reliable Judgments? 
 
 
 
 
If an expert is someone whose knowledge makes them a reliable witness 
on the subject in question, what happens when experts disagree? The 
image of a universe suggested that one must be right and the other 
wrong, but the idea of ‘stitching’ together different accounts, and the cor- 
responding image of a multiverse of different-but-relatable real worlds, 
offers an alternative solution to dissenting claims. Two accounts might 
appear to diverge yet still become compatible when their context had 
been fully understood, once the facts revealed by the relevant 
knowledge-practices can be properly related. Yet how can an expert 
simultaneously claim reliable judgement and a capacity for disagreement 
with other experts? Surely somebody must have the right answer! 
 
While some clashes between experts happen publically, in news pro- 
grammes, for instance, the majority of situations where a conflict of 
expertise occurs today are hidden from public view. Such disagreements 
occur behind the veil of secrecy that has been erected over the assess- 
ment of written scholarly reports, a process that is known as peer review. 
The majority of the judgements being made occur with anonymity – the 
identity of the people making the assessment are concealed from the 
authors in question. This anonymous peer review is supposed to have 
the effect of rendering more reliable judgements. But there is a confu- 
sion here that mirrors the problems already revealed about knowledge 
and real worlds. 
 
Earlier this year, I received a notification from one of the conferences 
for which I act as a peer reviewer, raising the important issue of disclos- 
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ing any potential conflicts of interest. Much of the content of this mes- 
sage merely laid out obvious instances where my judgement might be 
impaired by bias – a colleague I work with, for instance, or a former 
student. But the eighth and final clause made a much wider claim about 
possible conflicts of interest, asking that I must declare a conflict if the 
author of a paper I was reviewing was “someone about whom, for what- 
ever reason, their work cannot be evaluated objectively.” 
 
I immediately wrote to the person in charge of the conference track I was 
reviewing for and asked: 
Since I do not believe that humanities work can be evaluated objectively    
(and I have severe questions about whether scientific work can), clause 8 
applies for me to all possible people. Do you wish me to recuse myself from 
peer review on these grounds?1 
 
The argument I have been advancing in this book makes it clear why I 
would balk at being asked to vouch for my capacity to objectively review 
a humanities paper. Since objective knowledge, following Isabelle 
Stengers, is the result of getting an object to talk through the devel- 
opment of a suitable apparatus (i.e. the creation of spokespeople for 
objects), the idea of objectively evaluating any piece of human writing 
is farcical. We could count the number of words, but  beyond  such 
trivial facts the assessment of written discourse is not something that  
can belong to the domain of objective knowledge – and this claim is not 
dependent upon Stengers’ understanding of objectivity. 
 
One of my principal concerns about acquiring a doctorate, which I did   
a few years ago on the basis of books I had already published, was that 
assigning some people the rank of ‘doctor’ seems to undermine the basis 
of equality. If some of us are doctors and some of us aren’t, we no longer 
seem to be equal. We have created ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ people, at 
least in the context of knowledge. If this seems an overly paranoid per- 
spective, it is worth extending this concern about equality to the entire 
notion of an expert: most of us are committed to some kind of ideal of 
human equality, but as the preceding discussion of facts makes clear, our 
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political equality is undermined if not everybody is recognised as hav- 
ing a grasp on the facts. Against that, our entire concept of knowledge 
unravels if we do not recognise that some knowledge-practices provide 
a reliable grasp that is not available to everyone. 
 
There are two different problems to address here. The first is the question 
of whether experts can be equals to one another, whether or not the con- 
cept of an expert leads us to a ranking of expertise that undermines our 
notions of equality, or equivalently whether experts can make reliable 
judgements about each other’s work, and if they can, under what condi- 
tions this is reliability encouraged. This is the problem I want to examine 
in this section. Related to this, however, is the wider problem of whether 
the very existence of experts creates inequality between their ‘superior 
knowledge’ and whatever we wish to call non-experts. This latter con- 
cern is one that I will attempt to address in the final section of the book. 
 
To begin with, we must think through the question of how any two 
experts within any given field of enquiry or practice might be considered 
equal. Equality, a mathematical concept, is based upon the idea of same- 
ness of quantity, degree, or value, and the idea that two things are equal 
suggests an equivalence. But if we take any two experts, the knowledge- 
practices they have acquired will be different in a vast number of   ways 
– even if their expertise  is putatively on the same subject. The issue    
of whether experts can make reliable judgements then suggests another 
question: if knowledge is a practice, and if there are many real worlds, 
how can two experts be judged equal? 
 
Our interest in equality is a gift that we have inherited from the preceding 
centuries, but like the Golden Apple that Eris rolled into the marriage of 
Peleus and Thetis, this gift is also a source of discord. The problem here 
relates to the fundamental fact of existence that no two beings are equal 
in the sense of being the same – if they were, they would not be differ- 
ent entities. So the ideal of equality requires on the one hand that we 
understand the sense in which we can claim two utterly different things 
are equal, which is always open to dispute, and on the other the recogni- 
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tion that all equality comes by collecting some things and not others, that 
equality is always simultaneously inclusion and exclusion2. 
 
In the context of expertise, this hornet’s nest becomes even more com- 
plicated since, as already noted, to be recognised as an expert is to gain a 
capacity to speak that surpasses that of everyone else who is not famous. 
I’m going to suggest that it is fame that is the point here; a famous expert 
will be listened to more readily than one who is unknown, an observa- 
tion that seems trivial until we begin to consider how fame relates to the 
possession of knowledge-practices. We seem to face impossible contra- 
dictions within the ideal of equality: experts are not equal to one another, 
because some are famous and some are not, and what’s more the whole 
concept of an expert seems to undermine equality, since an expert is 
someone whose judgement we should trust, and thus there is an inference 
that the judgements of non-experts either cannot be trusted, or cannot be 
known to be trustworthy. 
I hope it’s clear why we might have cause for concern in this regard. If 
we are committed to equality, we need to spend some time understanding 
what we mean by it and determining which equalities are worth defend- 
ing. In this regard, it is worth remembering that not all philosophers are 
in support of equality – Nietzsche in particular found it offensive, sug- 
gesting it was “the most profound levelling down to mediocrity”3. I have 
great respect for Nietzsche, but concur with James Wilson that his con- 
cerns about morality as resentment do not rule out a moral equality of 
affirmation4. We can learn from Nietzsche without agreeing with every- 
thing he says – as indeed might be true of everyone else, perhaps even 
everything else. 
 
To unravel the question of equality between experts, and to begin to con- 
sider whether this equality could occur without the exclusion of every- 
one else, we need to look at the ways that experts talk to one another, 
and we need to compare this to a situation where discourse occurs as     
if we were equals. We have to ask: if we are indeed equals in some as- 
yet-undefined sense, where do we succeed in communicating with   one 
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another in a manner that supports that equality? For this task, I want to 
compare the discourse which aided the development of our contempo- 
rary notions of equality with a form of conversation that is as unique to 
our time as the Wikipedia. 
 
A Republic of Bloggers 
 
During the Enlightenment, at the end of the 17th century and the start  
of the 18th, a disparate group of intellectuals in Europe and the United 
States engaged in a long-distance discourse that became known as the 
Republic of Letters, or Respublica Literaria. It was one of the first 
transnational movements, as well as one of the first opportunities for 
women to come into intellectual congress with each other and with men5. 
Scholars have endlessly debated its relevance and influence upon the 
dramatically proclaimed Age of Enlightenment it heralded. Personally, I 
feel no need to explain this in terms of cause and effect – the Republic of 
Letters was simply the written discourse of a disparate community bound 
up with a transformation of the way people thought about their relation- 
ship with their world and with each other. 
 
It is a seldom noticed fact that while anyone who can read and write 
could write a letter, very few actually do – and fewer still in our current 
era, what it is tempting to call the Age of Distraction. Letters, rather than 
(say) postcards and other friendly waves expressed in writing, involve   
a kind of engagement that has become rather rare these days. A letter 
invites a response, asks us to think about something, requests insight 
from another perspective… Letters are conversations at a slow enough 
pace to allow the correspondents to think about what they are saying. I 
would like to suggest that it takes a particular kind of introvert to engage 
in letter writing in this sense – a quiet soul not content to bury themselves 
in just their solitary activities, but willing and able to reach out in words 
to another, similar person. I love a good conversation in a pub or bar,    
or at a conference, or even on a long journey, but as enjoyable as these 
forms of discourse may be for me they cannot adequately substitute for 
the pleasure of letters. 
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Up until 2000, I wrote letters extensively – to old school and university 
friends, to my lover (now my wife), to family… After this, I began to fall 
out of the habit for various reasons – partly reflective of a change in my 
circumstances (to that of both husband and company-owner), but also 
mirroring the gradual replacement of pen-and-paper with email and text 
messages, and the demise of the post office as the bastion of communi- 
cation in the wake of the digital connectivity of homes. The supplanting 
of the letter by these other digital forms of writing almost escaped my 
notice precisely because I had never stopped writing, even though I was 
starting to lose touch with communicating, at least in a written form. 
 
Yet in 2005, that all changed. A friend of mine from my time in London 
insisted I should try blogging. He could not give me any well-defined 
reasons for my doing so, it was more of an intuition. In July, I took the 
plunge and began writing a blog most mornings, more or less stream-of- 
consciousness. But in no time at all, I was engaging with other bloggers 
– discussing shared interests, exchanging ideas, and (perhaps most sur- 
prisingly) arguing productively – something the UseNet forums of the 
preceding decade had never managed to deliver. When you trap a bunch 
of geeks inside a virtual room, sparks soon begin to fly, and before you 
know it it’s bedlam. But the blog was a more personal format – it clearly 
belonged to one voice while being open to everyone to participate. While 
vicious arguments did occasionally break out, the blog owner could draw 
these away with new posts, and disgruntled visitors did not have the 
equal territorial claim of a forum and thus eventually fell silent. 
 
I had joined what I came to term ‘the Republic of Bloggers’, but it was 
already there when I arrived. I cannot even take credit for the name, since 
one of the regular voices at my blog explicitly drew my attention to the 
connectivity between blogs and the Republic of Letters. A scattering of 
intellectuals across the globe, engaged in discourse on almost every con- 
ceivable topic, listening to and speaking their minds. It was an incredi- 
ble, heady experience, one that I still treasure to this day. I have taken  
to calling the exchanges we had a form of virtuous discourse, to mark 
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not just the demeanour of our discussions but also its openness – anyone 
could listen into our conversations and, if so moved, join in. 
 
However, over the years I began to move away from discourse and into 
monologue. The blog became a place to draft material that would end up 
in books and papers, and the sense of an exchange of letters fell away. 
This was doubly unfortunate for me, since at this point I had also ceased 
to write letters, except to my favourite aunt, who sadly passed away a 
few years ago. Although I have blamed the decline of the blog clusters 
upon the rise of more immediate (and shallower) forms of communica- 
tion such as Facebook and Twitter, there was another factor I had not 
considered: we just stopped talking to each other. We were seduced by 
the simple validation that the social networks gave us, we began scor- 
ing shares and retweets instead of communicating for the sake of the dis- 
course itself. 
 
This idea, of discourse for its own sake, is one that has become alien 
today. This is especially true of academics, who are amongst those peo- 
ple who are paid (at least in part) to write, but who are uniquely tasked – 
particularly in the UK – to justify their writing, to make a case that their 
discourse is worthwhile. The idea that it might be good for a society or 
culture to have those of us who have developed the knowledge-practices 
associated with books to actually talk to one another, to have a discus- 
sion, a debate, an opportunity for an exchange of ideas has been pushed 
out of consideration by a demand to prove the benefits of scholarship:  
to humanity as an abstract, to a nation, or to an institution – whichever 
rhetoric happens to be demanded. 
 
Yet might not free discussion in itself have a value – a virtue, present in 
its exercise? This idea is close to forbidden, even though most academics 
already earn their keep through teaching students, and their writing and 
reading serves to further this aspect of our jobs. Indeed, this prohibition 
is not unique to the academy, for free discussion is actually terribly hard 
to find these days. I have already mentioned the problem that unless you 
are certified as an expert or happen to have acquired the    double-edged 
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sword of fame, your voice is not one that is likely to be heard outside of 
your local context. In this regard, those who can write letters, or can hold 
a written discourse, are the keepers of something precious – the inher- 
itors of the Republic of Letters. Both of these communities are a locus 
for virtuous discourse, and this is something worth both defending and 
encouraging, especially at a time when it has become painfully rare. 
The virtuous discourse of the Republic of Letters in the eighteenth cen- 
tury represented a free and anarchic process that can be contrasted quite 
dramatically to the discipline and order of the Royal Academies of the 
same era. Indeed, there were some attempts in Paris to subsume the for- 
mer into the latter, although this was not at the time successful6. The 
contrast appears even more drastic when considered in the context of 
the foundation of these learned societies in the preceding century. They 
appeared at a time when the publication of books was subject to direct 
scrutiny and censorship from the crown, and the Royal Academies were 
in fact the first institutions to be permitted to publish books indepen- 
dently of such oversight – but only because the texts in questions were 
reviewed by the societies for suitability. Even this allowance was only 
granted because the discussions in question were considered politically 
marginal, and of limited interest7. 
This is the origin of the aforementioned practice of peer review. It grew 
out of the conditions of censorship under royal rule, which gradually 
transformed into a risk-control process to protect the Royal Academies 
from the potentially disastrous consequences of publishing something 
that might cause their charter from the crown to be withdrawn8. ‘Peer’ in 
these original situations is more closely related to the concept of a ‘Peer 
of the Realm’ than a supposed equal. In this respect, the peer review 
process at the time of the Republic of Letters is radically disconnected 
from today’s academic peer review, the rhetoric of which is more con- 
cerned about claims of objective assessment of content that my preced- 
ing discussion has hopefully already rendered suspect. 
 
Throughout its history, peer review has never lost its role in disciplining 
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the discourses that fall under its purview, a matter that connects to the 
questions concerning the exercise of power raised by Michel Foucault9. 
These issues remain relevant today, for reasons that warrant closer exam- 
ination. At stake here is the question of whether ‘peer review’ really 
does imply a community of equals, and if it does who is included and 
who excluded. Against even the possibility of academic peers being con- 
sidered equals is the risk that peer review might never have lost its 
genealogical connection with the censorship it grew out of. There is a 
possibility, perhaps hard to bring into adequate focus, that academic peer 
review even now, in at least some of its forms, might be using an implau- 
sible rhetoric of objective truth in order to apply a nefarious kind of cen- 
sorship that prevents it from being a form of virtuous discourse. 
 
Hiding Behind Masks 
 
While the origins of anonymous peer review practices are still a matter 
of some uncertainty, there is a general consensus that it appeared and 
spread after World War II10. We can see in the peer review guidelines I 
mentioned at the start of this section something of the motive for bring- 
ing anonymity into play: the idea that knowing the identity of the author 
might bring in bias. If you know that a paper was authored by Einstein, 
you might be unwilling to criticise the work for fear of the consequences 
of impugning such an august figure. That said, the only time Einstein 
was submitted to peer review, the reviewer in question had no problem 
providing ten pages of criticism, a situation that offended Einstein and 
caused him to withdraw his paper from the journal in question and never 
write for it again11. 
 
There are two kinds of anonymous peer review practices in use today 
for journals and conferences. Single blind peer review occurs when the 
reviewer’s identities are hidden from the author – this is what happened 
to Einstein. Double-blind peer review occurs when the author’s identity 
is also hidden from the reviewers – this is what I was involved in when  
I read the note about ‘objective evaluation’. While both practices are in 
widespread use, the later is particularly common and none of the    jour- 
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nals I’ve worked with, and only a small number of the conferences I’ve 
attended, use anything other than double-blind peer review. If double- 
blind is justified by the rhetoric of bias, single blind is justified by pro- 
tecting the reviewers from influence or recriminations by the authors. 
Either way, anonymity is predicated on the idea that peer review is either 
more objective, or fairer, when it occurs under a veil of secrecy. 
It is easy to imagine some possible intuitions that might set up these 
kinds of thoughts. If humans are naturally biased because subjective 
knowledge is inherently unreliable, and if academic discourse aims at 
truth, we ought to take steps to offset that bias. From here, we get to the 
idea of peer review as a system of checks and balances, and from this 
the idea that anonymous review will necessarily be fairer – a rhetoric 
that almost always appears wherever double blind review is defended. 
As recently as 2014, the high profile science journal Nature was quoted 
as saying: “It makes the review process a bit more scientific… Removing 
the opportunity for subconscious bias is a good thing.”12 It is worth 
remembering that scientific experiments had already adopted double- 
blind procedures to help eliminate bias in their results: adding this proto- 
col to publishing probably seemed like a logical extension. 
 
The anonymity is far harder to justify in the context of the humanities. 
Whatever reasons might be given would seem to depend upon copying 
the justification provided within the sciences, whose methods are very 
different in form. This entire line of reasoning seems to run on the 
assumption that we will not give an honest appraisal of work by someone 
whom we are dealing with in the manner of a face-to-face exchange,  
but we will talk honestly behind their back – that gossip is more candid 
than conversation. There might be something to that intuition… we often 
lack the courage to confront those around us on certain issues, and it     
is certainly easier and safer to mouth off when the people being spo- 
ken about aren’t listening. The comparison with gossip ought to give us 
pause, though: the other thing we gain when we are talking about some- 
one and not to them is a freedom to unleash our petty hatreds. 
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I study play and games, and I have another perspective to bring to     
bear on this issue. From the text-based worlds of the MUDs in the 
1990s13 through to the competitive communities around gun games 
today, online worlds afford their players an anonymity that permits the 
most atrocious behaviour to occur14. Shielded by a virtual mask, we feel 
disconnected from consequences and more free to act on our impulses. 
This is by no means a certain consequence; it is more of a risk. But any- 
one who has played online will have seen that the treatment of other 
players is frequently harsh and unpleasant when anonymity is in play. 
What offsets this is when players form their own communities, as hap- 
pened in the MUDs and happens now in their successors, graphical 
worlds like those of World of Warcraft (Blizzard, 2004). Identifying  
with a group helps stabilise cordial relationships. When nothing like this 
occurs, the power relations become unstable and we get what is called in 
games ‘griefing’15 and in social media ‘cyberbullying’16. 
The Wikipedia has a parallel story to tell. Anonymous accounts have 
consistently been shown to be responsible for the majority of the van- 
dalism upon its pages17. Anonymous editors “constitute a controversial 
group within the Wikipedian community”18 precisely because those that 
wish to cause harm to the project are bound to use the mask of anonymity 
to do so. This situation has resulted in considerable animosity towards 
anonymous editors, but eliminating this possibility not only undercuts 
the promise of being a text that ‘anyone can edit’, it actively precludes 
involvement from anyone whose circumstances make it dangerous to be 
identified (e.g. political radicals living in oppressive regimes). Paul de 
Laat argues against eliminating anonymity precisely because “Wikipedia 
is founded on a social contract that considers registered and non- 
registered contributors as equal citizens”19. This is a point that will have 
to wait for the next chapter. 
 
There is a somewhat romantic aspect to the way we view masks today 
that can be seen most clearly in our superhero mythos, where the pro- 
tagonists wear masks to protect their identity. If they do not (the internal 
story logic claims), their families and loved ones would be at risk  from 
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reprisals from the supervillains (who are also masked). These stories 
descend from the pulp novels of the early twentieth century with masked 
heroes such as Zorro and the Scarlet Pimpernel. Prior to this, masked 
characters are ubiquitously outlaws, such as highwaymen. It is notewor- 
thy that while we have plenty of masked criminals today, we have no 
masked heroes, and law enforcement officers and judges are always pub- 
lically identified. I doubt this is a coincidence. Fictional masked heroes 
are imbued with a mythological degree of virtue that allows  them  to  
act as heroes despite their anonymous circumstances. Real humans find 
behaving virtuously to be far more challenging. 
Anonymous peer review might be the only widespread situation where 
the romantic idea of the protection of a mask distracts us from the risks 
of bad behaviour that goes with a concealed identity. Yet it is not that we 
have failed to recognise the problems with these masks. Indeed, there is a 
growing sense of concern about the situation we have let happen, and of 
the problems that secrecy engenders, almost all of which rest on the lack 
of accountability that occurs because the reviewer has all the power and 
is shielded from the consequences of their actions20. There are reports of 
reviewers intentionally blocking work they disagree with, disproportion- 
ately approving the work of researchers with similar agendas, and even 
stealing ideas from the work they have been assigned to review21. 
The concerns about anonymous peer review have been growing for some 
twenty years now, yet change is slow to come. The atmosphere in this 
regard is reflected in a recent report by the British Academy that con- 
cludes, without a trace of irony, that despite the current arrangements 
being time-consuming, costly, and biased against innovation, there are 
“no better alternatives”. This kind of statement is what Stengers and her 
chemist colleague Philippe Pignarre call an infernal alternative22. These 
are situations where a prevailing state of affairs cannot be challenged 
except by merely noting that, yes, it’s a bad arrangement, but what choice 
do we have? Whether we are talking about representational democracy, 
welfare reform, free market economics, capitalist production, or indeed 
anonymous peer review, we are only offered infernal alternatives. 
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I cannot hope to address all of the issues that this question of infernal 
alternatives raises, but it is clear that it not only kills politics by accepting 
the status quo as ‘inevitable’ but it also denies our creative imagination 
with respect to the challenges we face. Indeed, the central difficulty with 
the masks of anonymous peer review is precisely that we do not face its 
problems at all, but rather refuse to look those others we are engaging 
with in the eye. Once we understand that objective knowledge is not a 
plausible way of understanding human judgement, we have to question 
those practices that invoke this mythos to justify their continuation. We 
should be especially suspicious whenever decisions are being cloaked in 
secrecy. 
While the British Academy may have offered an infernal alternative in 
respect of anonymous peer review, their failure of imagination is not uni- 
versal. Economists were one of the first disciplines to investigate what 
others merely assumed, and concluded that double-blind peer review’s 
main effects were lower rates of acceptance and more hostile reports on 
what had been submitted23. Anonymity did not affect the acceptance of 
work by women (an alleged benefit of concealing the author’s identity), 
and in slightly under half of the cases it was possible for the reviewer to 
establish the identity of the author despite the blind protocol24. 
The British Medical Journal recently conducted its own research into 
the topic and explored what happens when reviewers are told that their 
signed reviews will be publically available for scrutiny. They found that 
this provision had no significant effect on the quality of the reviews 
offered, although it did cause many peer reviewers to decline to par- 
ticipate, and increased the time it took to write reports25. These side 
effects are surely to be expected (it certainly takes longer to understand 
an author’s argument than to dismiss it!) but can hardly constitute a rea- 
son for refusing to take this path. If the mask of the reviewer creates the 
conditions for indolent or scurrilous behaviour, we should expect fewer 
reviewers to want to participate. Yet a failure of courage on the part of 
the academic community should not be used to shore up the infernal 
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alternative: it should demonstrate the importance of exploring a different 
approach. 
There is now a growing resistance to anonymous peer review that carries 
with it the hope of escaping the infernal alternative and restoring to the 
academy the concept of community and the possibility of virtuous dis- 
course. The aforementioned British Medical Journal report concluded 
that the ethical arguments overweighed the disadvantages26, and this 
view has been mirrored elsewhere. Digital journals like Kairos have 
developed review methods that entail protracted discussions about sub- 
missions that are not publically shared, but the identities of its board   
are at least provided and thus not protected by a mask of anonymity27. 
This is another form of virtuous discourse, in this case about the submis- 
sions, and those that are judged as suitable for publication are assigned 
a ‘coach’ to work with the author to bring up the quality of writing or 
otherwise address issues without the exchanges being veiled in secrecy. 
 
Similarly, Kathleen Fitzpatrick has not only recognised the problem of 
the infernal alternative that accompanies reform of peer review28 but  
has suggested an alternative system of peer-to-peer review as an open, 
digitally-empowered alternative to the prevailing practices29. Drawing 
on the work of Bill Readings, she suggests that the anonymous peer 
review model is oppressive, bringing about a forced agreement about 
standards and an ability to hide behind concealed notions of excel- 
lence30. She makes the case that if scholarly discourse claims to value 
openness, we have a duty to enact it. Aaron J. Barlow goes further: 
“Blind peer review is dead. It just doesn’t know it yet.”31 While the 
forms of open peer review that might be adopted are still being invented 
and discussed, the process of supplanting the immoral practice of anony- 
mous peer review has already begun, putting academics back into virtu- 
ous discourse, and thus onto equal footing with one another. 
 
The Justice of Transparency 
 
We are not equal if we are hidden behind a mask of secrecy:  anonymity 
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affords power to the reviewer and curses the author with a powerlessness 
stemming from the lack of accountability shielding their judge. Masked 
or not, we cannot count upon humans to make perfect judgements 
because the deployment of our knowledge-practices to make decisions is 
never a form of objective knowledge, never the result of getting objects 
to talk. Indeed, those who think that reducing a situation to, say, num- 
bers, is a way to think objectively are confused: such people are exercis- 
ing a particularly narrow and dangerous kind of subjectivity. If we want 
our experts to make anything close to reliable judgements about each 
other’s work, we must expect those judgements to be open to scrutiny, 
however this is to be achieved, because it is only through responding to 
appropriate challenges that reliability can be successfully attained. 
This was a point raised, in a radically different context, by the Enlight- 
enment philosopher Immanuel Kant, himself a part of the Republic of 
Letters that pursued virtuous discourse long before blogs had even been 
conceived. He spoke of a ‘principle of publicity’32, but since publicity 
now has a different implication it might be clearer to think of this as 
Kant’s transparency principle. Domingo García-Marzá clarifies Kant’s 
idea by suggesting it requires institutions to commit both to a minimum 
requirement – that no policy be pursued in secret if making it public 
knowledge would provoke inevitable objections (the negative formula- 
tion) – and an ideal to achieve, namely that just policies should pursue  
a search for agreement that must take place through communal discus- 
sion (the positive formulation)33. As García-Marzá explains, the purpose 
of the transparency principle is the pursuit of trust, which all just institu- 
tions must work towards or else violate Kant’s moral demand for mutual 
respect34. 
 
The negative formulation offers a clear indictment of anonymous peer 
review. According to this version of the transparency principle, any 
action that could not be viably conducted if its motivations and purposes 
were made public is inherently injust. Kant’s own point concerned the 
secret activities of nations – a matter that is even more important today 
than it was in Kant’s time – but his principle applies just as saliently   to 
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peer review. We know that the masks of anonymity are being used, in at 
least some cases, to act in ways that would not be tolerated were they to 
be made public. This is a clear violation of the transparency principle. 
 
It is worth noting that there could still be a case for offering anonymity 
to the author and not to the reviewer – since it is not entirely clear that 
the author has any capacity for abuse in concealing their identity. Some- 
one who felt that they could not be judged fairly because (say) they 
were from an institution with a bad reputation, or who feared their race 
or gender would provoke misjudgements, might have reasons to choose 
anonymity. But one of the problems with double-blind peer review in 
practice is that because it requires the mask, it asks the author in many 
situations to lie about their work. To make a paper anonymous means to 
erase the connections between previous publications and current work, 
and this creates a strange logic whereby deception is supposed to lead 
(according to the prevailing mythos of peer review) to objective truth.  
If the transparency principle is accepted, the choice to submit a paper 
anonymously could be just, but the requirement for anonymity appears to 
go too far, and for the peer reviewers (as already noted) even this choice 
ought not to be offered. 
 
Some objections ought to be considered. Doesn’t this demand for trans- 
parency just render all secret activities illicit? This is not the case. The 
transparency principle only asks that we consider thought experiments 
regarding the effect of making policies (Kant says ‘maxims’) public. A 
secret ballot rests on a policy of allowing individual voters to keep pri- 
vate whom they wished to support: making this policy public has no 
effect on our judgement of secret ballots. Indeed, we know full well this 
is the policy being pursued, and we endorse it. The concept of a secret 
ballot supports trust, rather than undermines it; there is no inherent con- 
flict with the transparency principle here. Along similar lines, optional 
anonymity of an author in peer review might be something we can accept 
since we might judge it fair that they can choose this option, but hiding 
the identities of reviewers invites abuse and ought to be excluded from 
consideration. 
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Axel Gosseries suggests a rather different kind of problem: if Kant’s  
principle is a test for justice based on whether transparency is self- 
defeating for a policy, isn’t it odd that a police raid on a criminal 
organisation occurring on a specific day would fail the test, since it 
would be self-defeating to publicise the date that such a raid were to 
occur?35 Here, the problem (as Gosseries recognises) is that the policy 
has been made too specific. But it would be rather odd to declare a policy 
of secret raids on criminals that came with a fixed list of dates. The 
purpose of the transparency principle is only to set a minimum bar for 
actions conducted in secret: that public knowledge of the policy would 
not produce objections. That said, we should always be careful when 
using the kind of formulations Kant provides as a ‘sausage machine’  
for calculating ethics, as Allen Wood has warned36. Just institutions, as 
García-Marzá explains, come from the search for agreement, and never 
from mere calculation. 
 
The moment I began to suspect that anonymous peer review might be a 
fundamentally immoral practice, I began to append to my own reports   
a notice to those who had asked me to conduct the peer review stating 
my willingness to be identified to those whose work I have assessed. 
Knowing this was even a possibility encouraged me to work harder on 
my peer reviews, to ensure I understood the authors’ arguments, and to 
make certain that my report would make a reliable judgement of the suit- 
ability of the paper in question for the respective journal or conference. 
More than this, it all but guaranteed that I would have to treat the authors 
with respect, that we would work together co-operatively for a better 
outcome. Even in the sciences, where double-blind peer review remains 
popular, the evidence demonstrates that co-operative, open review pro- 
duces greater co-operation and reduces the risk of reviewing errors37. 
Anonymous peer review has the opposite effect: it permits inequitable 
power relations between those involved, and undermines trust in its own 
policy of secrecy every time an unreliable judgement has been rendered. 
 
The principal counter-argument that can be mounted against open peer 
review depends upon the idea of bias being prevented by concealing 
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identities. Yet it is only concealing the author’s identity that could help 
eliminate bias, and anonymous peer review is currently based around 
anonymous reviewers. Besides, we have already seen that bias can thrive 
under the mask of anonymity. Demanding reviewer secrecy to prevent 
bias is like asking the fox to guard the hen house: even if we could find a 
fox virtuous enough to resist the inevitable temptation, we’d still want to 
keep a watchful eye. Open peer review may be harder for academics to 
accept – it means their evaluations will be available for scrutiny, which 
is certainly more unsettling than making judgements in private. But if a 
scholar is not virtuous enough to write reports that can be made public in 
this way, we can scarcely expect them to be on their best behaviour when 
their assessments are kept secret. 
 
Although it may not be readily apparent, our image of a universe is once 
again what has got us into trouble. For as long as the application of 
knowledge-practices is to be assessed against a single real world, every- 
thing appears to have a single right answer. But even if every question 
had a single right answer, it would not be the case that a single method 
would provide the sole means of establishing that answer. What’s more, 
given the recognition that meaning is something more than mere objec- 
tive knowledge, every question of meaning can have more than one cor- 
rect answer. Objects have facts to give us, but meanings are what beings 
provide to facts – and the worlds in which these meanings find their 
sense are just as real as the imagined world of facts that intersects them. 
To think otherwise is to misunderstand what meaningfulness entails. 
 
We can count upon those who have worked on perfecting their 
knowledge-practices to be reliable witnesses who can provide answers to 
questions of the kinds they have learned how to answer. But we should 
expect that different knowledge-practices that have distinct methods for 
answering those questions will sometimes disagree, even when the sub- 
ject matter is identical. In a universe of brute facts, this situation was 
untenable and intolerable. But in an ecology of practices, a plurality of 
realisms, or a multiverse of real worlds, disagreement is always a first 
step in a new discourse – it is never its end. 
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Where Can We Find Equality? 
 
 
 
 
Our ideals of equality are among the most important moral and political 
concepts today. Appeals to equality are used in attempts to defend 
against prejudice and discrimination, to demand better treatment in 
employment or education, and even to indict the existing state of affairs 
as intolerable and in need of overthrowing. These ideals are simulta- 
neously deployed to bring about horrendous injustices – as when war 
and extermination are conducted with a justification of pursuing human 
rights1, which are founded on a concept of equal treatment. The stakes of 
misunderstanding equality can literally be life and death. We ought to be 
as clear as we can which kinds of equality are worth pursuing. Where, in 
the chaotic disagreements of contemporary politics, can we actually find 
equality? 
 
My father was a tremendously practical man, and I was always a great 
admirer of his competence. He had served as a mechanic in the RAF, 
and had serviced the great Sunderland flying boats at Castle Archdale, 
although long after their pivotal role in locating the Bismarck. After 
mustering out, he serviced vans for the post office and also worked for a 
while as a butcher. When I was growing up, he ran a handyman service, 
and indeed to my knowledge he never once had to hire a tradesman to 
work on our house because he could act as builder, joiner, plumber, elec- 
trician, and painter and decorator – not to mention grow his own fruit and 
vegetables, make jam and wine, farm chickens, maintain and rebuilt all 
kinds of mechanical device, and probably many more skills that I have 
forgotten. 
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I, on the other hand, have spent my life with books and games of all 
kinds, and almost all my competences have to do with the manipulation 
of words and ideas. I can write and edit documents at a level of skill  
that has allowed me to make a living from doing so, and I have also 
acquired considerable experience of different kinds of play and games, 
having established myself as an expert game designer, writer and consul- 
tant. In the last two decades, I’ve read so much philosophy that I find it 
difficult to remember what it was like to think non-philosophically about 
certain topics. I acquired a Bachelors and a Masters degree in computer 
science, and on the basis of my books I was able to be declared a ‘doc- 
tor’, adding a PhD to the end of my name. 
 
My father and I could not have possessed more radically different 
knowledge-practices. He was the quintessential generalist, able to thrive 
in any practical situation, and far less dependent upon the support of oth- 
ers than I am on a day-to-day basis. I am the archetypical expert, spe- 
cialised in my own peculiar topics, and certified by the education system 
all the way to the top of ladder. My father was proud of my academic 
achievements – he was more thrilled about my university graduation than 
I was, and would have been delighted at my earning the doctorate if    
he had lived to see it. But I was also extremely proud of my father’s 
achievements, both in terms of his self-sufficiency, and also as a dedi- 
cated family man and a respected member of his community, whom he 
loved and who loved him. 
 
When we think about equality we tend to think of it as applying to the 
social world that exists between us – as requiring our common treat- 
ment (equal rights), as providing open access to life options (equality of 
opportunity), or perhaps as ensuring we all get a fair share (equality of 
outcome). Equality on these kinds of understandings is a political con- 
cept, something that shapes the way we inter-relate. Political equality 
entails a fundamental recognition of inequality, that we start with dif- 
ferent capabilities, different resources, different liabilities, and thus the 
drive for equality (in its various forms) serves to offset the differences 
and create a state of equality. So, for instance, the support given to people 
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who are deemed ‘disabled’ is often justified as levelling the playing 
field, adding equality where previously there was only differences. 
 
I want to offer a radically different understanding of equality. I want to 
suggest – as strange as it may sound – that my father and I were equal  
in intelligence. This runs utterly contrary to the way we have learned to 
judge intellectual capacity. After all, I have every academic qualification 
available, while my father did not to my knowledge possess anything 
other than basic school certificates. Surely, I must be judged to have a 
superior intellect – everyone tells me I’m incredibly smart, after all – 
and thus (although we politely decline to say it aloud) that my father  
had an inferior intellect. That is the order of the world we have been 
placed within (this line of thinking goes), and thus why we must commit 
to building an equal society – so that these advantages and disadvantages 
can be balanced away in the pursuit of fairness. 
 
No, I cannot accept that. My father may have acquired different skills, 
his knowledge-practices may have been very different from mine, but to 
suggest that the way he used his mind and body inherently means he was 
less intelligent than me is to take a very specific concept of intelligence 
and make it into a mythos, a metaphysical picture, an untestable postu- 
late that has become unchallenged precisely because we have lost our 
ability to recognise it, much less question it. Our entire education system, 
from nursery to school, from high school to university, is built upon the 
idea that there is a hierarchy of intelligence to be uncovered, one which 
requires us to sort our children according to their innate mental facul- 
ties. Whether we’re talking about grammar schools in the UK or grading 
curves in the US, the mythos of intellectual inequality pervades the very 
concept of education today. 
Against the prevailing mythos, I want to offer a different picture, one that 
I take from the philosopher Jacques Rancière, who in turn was inspired 
by an eighteenth and nineteenth century French educator named Joseph 
Jacotot2. Jacotot is another figure from the Age of Enlightenment, the 
era which has bequeathed us this intense interest in equality. He was 
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an advocate for what he called ‘intellectual emancipation’, which was 
founded upon the idea – the discovery, really – that education need never 
involve explanation, and that when it did, there was always a risk that 
the ability to understand the specific form of explanation (the teacher’s 
method of explaining) would outstrip the importance of any actual learn- 
ing. Jacotot discovered that it was possible to teach anything – even what 
you yourself do not know! – provided the process of learning was prop- 
erly understood. 
Rancière is acutely aware of the sense of madness that accompanies the 
suggestion of equality of intelligence. Considering the performance of 
children in schools as alleged evidence for unequal intelligence, he notes 
that the key objection is voiced by saying that it is a fact that one child 
succeeds better than another in school, and that therefore the child who 
enjoys this success must be more intelligent. But, Rancière shrewdly 
observes, this ‘therefore’ implies a causal connection between two dif- 
ferent facts, and here we have only one3. ‘More intelligent’ is not an 
explanation for success in school, it is merely another name for academic 
success, and renaming facts is not even close to objective knowledge. It 
is at best a metaphor for them, and at worst an empty assertion. 
 
What we have here is merely circular reasoning: to be intelligent means 
to succeed in school, so anyone who does not succeed in school is not 
intelligent. But we already have our doubts about this formula, because 
we have long since realised that ‘standard testing’ ignores the immense 
differences in our worlds4, and we also suspect that everyone learns     
in different ways, even if every attempt to formulate this recognition  
has fallen down against the challenges involved in teasing out objective 
knowledge when it is about beings like us5. 
Far easier to turn an electron into a reliable witness than to make human 
learning a topic for objective knowledge! That’s why psychology has hit 
something of a crisis of faith in itself6: it’s not really worked out what it 
is supposed to be a spokesperson for, what its knowledge-practices can 
successfully render reliable. It’s not that there have not been great   suc- 
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cess stories in psychology – Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dis- 
sonance7, Robert Fantz’s work in infant perception8, and Paul Ekman’s 
stunning work on emotions are all among the great research projects     
of the previous century9. It’s just that too many psychological experi- 
ments have been taken at face value, or have drawn premature conclu- 
sions from fairly thin statistical data. Not enough work has been done to 
make the apparatus resist objections. 
 
Instead of buying into the mythos of ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ people that 
expertise implies, and that the conventional rhetoric of school education 
enforces, we should consider the merit of rejecting the whole idea of 
superiors and inferiors, and denying that inferiors (whoever they might 
be) are incapable of doing what a superior can do10. That way of think- 
ing about humanity can only be a mythos of powerlessness. As long as 
we must think about superiors and inferiors, those who happen to have 
power and control can justify their position on the grounds of their supe- 
riority, and we are back to the seduction of facts, and politics-as-war. 
We should not be taken in by this assumption, for we have no reason to 
accept it and every reason to overthrow it. What if there never were supe- 
riors and inferiors… what if there was just equality of intelligence? 
 
Orbiting the Truth 
 
Already the mental barriers are up, the opposition reflex kicks in, and the 
idea that we might possess equal intelligence becomes something diffi- 
cult to accept. Perhaps you are proud of your own intellectual prowess 
and accomplishments, and this newfangled concept feels like a threat to 
your self-esteem. Perhaps your view of yourself is less haughty, and you 
find the path to equality of intelligence blocked by your certainty that 
other people must be smarter than you are. Perhaps you have merely 
empirical concerns, that (say) surely not everyone can be Einstein. These 
problems can be addressed, each in their own way, in good time. 
 
However, whatever the blockade between you and equal intelligence 
might be, perhaps it will help to invert Rancière’s optimistic formula- 
60 Wikipedia Knows Nothing 
 
 
tion… if you cannot accept that we possess an equality of intelligence, 
perhaps you can simply accept that we are all equally stupid. This is 
perhaps an easier pill to swallow: we usually don’t have any difficulty 
accepting the evidence of human foolishness, since it is manifested every 
way we look. But then, we ought to pause for a moment, since even if we 
can mentally accept this idea, we may find that beneath this simple sup- 
position we have secretly set aside out own stupidity, perhaps because if 
we don’t trust our own judgement we will be unable to act at all. Under 
the concept of ubiquitous stupidity might lurk a secret bunker where we 
ourselves are safely excluded from culpability. 
Let us tackle this by going back once more to Descartes, and since so 
much of this book has served to put him in the role of accidental villain, 
let us give him the chance to return one last time as a hero. He should,  
in point of fact, already be a hero to anyone who holds the sciences in 
high regard, for it was Descartes dedicated enquiry into doubt that cre- 
ated the conditions for a quest for scientific certainty, and who thus ini- 
tiated “a relentless sifting of the credentials of all kinds of knowledge”, 
as Mary Midgley puts the matter11. Our endless desire to point out his 
errors today is only the child’s desire to wriggle out from the influence 
of their parents… we have to turn on Descartes because otherwise we’d 
have to admit our reliance upon him. This much is true of so many of the 
philosophers who went before us – including, of course, Plato’s equiva- 
lent influence upon Descartes. 
 
From Jacotot’s journal, Rancière quotes an extract where the educator 
has translated a section of Descartes’ work into his own phrasing: “Man 
is a will served by an intelligence.”12 This formula is a secret inheritance 
from Descartes that Rancière uses as the core of his call for emanci- 
pation, but we must be careful to understand it. As Midgley explains, 
Plato’s vision of reason governing our instincts came to Descartes, and 
was passed on to Kant, all the time honouring the value of thought. But 
soon after, doubts emerged about whether thought could secure meaning, 
a crisis that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard passed on to the existentialists. 
Will came to mean something like arrogance, obstinacy13.   Conversely, 
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when we talk about humans as ‘a will served by an intelligence’, what  
is meant by ‘will’ is no more nor less than our capacity to take decisive 
action towards our goals or desires. 
A will served by an intelligence is a means of understanding why we 
have all acquired different knowledge-practices: we have all willed dif- 
ferent things, at different times. When my will was focussed upon under- 
standing games, I learned the knowledge-practice of game design that 
reliably creates systems for conditioning play in certain subtle ways. 
When my father’s will was focussed upon the Sunderland flying boats, 
he learned the knowledge-practices of repairing its mechanical systems. 
For Rancière, learning and understanding is only ever a kind of transla- 
tion, and every text or system is simply something we will discover how 
to translate into our own terms, whether we are talking about a philoso- 
phy book, a game, or an aeroplane14. 
So while an individual could be anything they want to be – that they will 
to be – they first must want it, that is, they must will it15. The inequal- 
ities we observe in the ways intelligence is manifested are taken in the 
old mythos as evidence of two kinds of mind – a superior and an infe- 
rior intellect. But there is no reason it has to be understood this way. It  
is equally viable to understand these differences as being of the will, not 
the intelligence. What seems like stupidity would then be a simple lack 
of interest, a lack of attention – a failure of will, not a failure of intelli- 
gence. This would mean there is no reason for intelligence to be differ- 
entially distributed, for there to be a hierarchy of smartness… it might 
mean there was an equality of intelligence16. 
 
For this account to remain plausible, we might need some assurance  
that it is consistent with our biology – that the spokespeople for human 
anatomy could either reliably report that this is the case, or at the very 
least could not rule it out. But equality of intelligence, an equal capacity 
to learn any knowledge-practice, is not something that we could produce 
objective knowledge for. It would require restarting our lives, setting 
them back to initial conditions – it would essentially require time travel. 
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But if nothing else, equality of intelligence does not contradict what the 
reliable witnesses we have made from our anatomy have to say. Learn- 
ing, as Rancière himself notes, is partly remembering and partly relat- 
ing17. These are functions co-ordinated by a part of our brain known as 
the hippocampus – and it is at least a hint towards equality of intelligence 
that different knowledge-practices affect the sizes of these organs18. This 
is far from proof. But the possibility remains open that our capacity to 
learn knowledge-practices, our intelligence, could be equal. 
 
On this path, we find that the primordial vice must be laziness. We exer- 
cise our intelligence every time we acquire a knowledge-practice, and 
this process always entails a phenomenal degree of repetition, which is 
boring19. It is only if our will engages with the relevant topic (what- 
ever it might be) that we persevere and our practice becomes knowledge, 
becomes capable of reliability. Whenever our will is not engaged in this 
way, our intelligence never becomes involved. Whenever we do will our 
intelligence to get involved, we cannot help but learn. Our differences of 
ability are not, on this understanding, anything to do with differences of 
intelligence: they are to do with differences of will. 
 
By understanding learning in this way, and choosing to view intelligence 
as a capacity we all hold equally, Rancière develops Jacotot’s idea that 
you do not need to know something to teach it. Because the core of the 
relationship between teacher and student is not that the teacher translates 
for the student – when this happens, we make a very risky bet that the 
two people will understand in the same way. Maybe in a universe that 
would make sense, but we don’t live in such a place. Successful teaching 
is not about trying to join two intelligences together – such an endeavour 
is always a gamble. It is about joining two wills together in the common 
task of learning. When the teacher is committed to the student’s learning, 
how the student learns can be left as something to discover. What matters 
is that common commitment to learning, a relationship of will-to-will, 
compelling the student to apply their intelligence in their own way20. 
 
What misled us is the idea that learning and understanding had to be 
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done in a particular way if it was to be correct, and as beings living in a 
multiverse this approach has to be suspect. Learning is translation, and I 
cannot translate for you – if I do, all I will do is add another unnecessary 
step into the chain of events leading to your acquisition of the relevant 
knowledge-practice. I can commit to your learning without forcing you 
to learn the way that I did (although if we can learn in the same way,    
so much the better). It is therefore correct that not everyone can be Ein- 
stein – but anyone whose will can be set in the same direction as Ein- 
stein’s could acquire Einstein’s knowledge-practices, and every teacher 
of physics who does not mistake what learning means can help any stu- 
dent who wills this down that very same path. 
Veracity is the name that Rancière gives to the individual experience of 
truth, noting that we shall not find truth if we look for it solely within 
what is said. Statements are not truth (facts are not knowledge), although 
they can certainly indicate our appreciation for it. Indeed, truth is not 
something that can be given: it is what is experienced, not what is said21. 
Veracity puts us metaphorically in orbit of the truth, and we can all be in 
orbit of the same truth without being in the same orbit. Indeed, no two 
orbits will ever be exactly the same, which is why it is dangerous for a 
teacher to insist on the student learning the same way they did22. 
Truth is not some foreign land of objectivity that we have to struggle to 
reach, as justified true belief suggested, it is something for which we all 
possess a uniquely individual familiarity. We each must have our own 
orbit around the truth23. If you did not, you could not have a relationship 
with truth: you would merely be relying upon someone else’s experience 
of it. Sometimes, we have to do this, because we can’t know everything, 
we can’t learn all possible knowledge-practices. But whenever we trust 
a reliable witness of the truth, or rely upon a spokesperson for objec- 
tive knowledge, we don’t have knowledge, because we didn’t learn a 
knowledge-practice from which we can experience veracity. 
 
Veracity is something that is felt, and it is the moral foundation of knowl- 
edge24 because if we do not have a knowledge-practice that puts us into 
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a viable orbit, we simply don’t know, and then we can only trust other 
people’s experience of veracity. But we can trust others to possess verac- 
ity precisely because they have their own knowledge-practices, and the 
intelligence that allows us to acquire these practices is something we all 
share equally. This is the meaning of equality of intelligence, and it is    
a kind of equality that we can obtain instantly, at the very moment we 
decide to be emancipated and recognise that we are all fundamentally 
equal. We are all a will served by an intelligence. 
 
The idea of veracity gives us another path into the multiverse, and 
explains why there is a truth to be found in this peculiar image whether 
it is expressed as many real worlds, as plural realism, or as an ecology  
of practices. Each of these concepts is orbiting around the same truth. 
Equality of intelligence is the only ideal of equality that we need to 
complete the work of the Enlightenment, a project that has run aground 
because almost as soon as humanity decided we could all be equal, it 
found excuses to make new kinds of superiors and inferiors. But there 
are no inferiors. There is only equality of intelligence, and will figuring 
out will. 
 
A Community of Equals 
 
For Kant, what all humans shared in common was our rational capacity 
to will different ends, that is, to set ourselves towards certain courses   
of action or outcomes. It is from this that he derives his principle of 
mutual respect, claiming that once we recognise this commonality we 
must allow each person to set their own ends provided they are compat- 
ible with a similar freedom for all. For Kant, this ability to will our ends 
bestows an inviolable dignity, and for this reason all beings that pos- 
sess it (whether human or not) have equal worth25. Once again, this is a 
mythos, a metaphysical picture… but without this or something like it, 
it’s far from clear that there is any basis for human equality. 
 
Rancière puts Kant’s  idea in a radically different way by suggesting  
that equality and intelligence are synonymous, as are reason and  will26. 
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But while it’s comparatively clear how reasoning and the power of will 
could be equivalent, it sounds strange to say that intelligence and equal- 
ity are the same. But this is merely Kant’s observation subtly reconsid- 
ered: our common capacity for knowledge-practices is what makes us 
equal, because any of us could have learned any knowledge-practice – 
everyone has the same potential for knowing, and thus the same intelli- 
gence. There is no objective knowledge-practice that can confirm this; it 
is only a possibility. But what a possibility! It is one worth imagining. 
What draws us away from thinking of humanity as comprised of equals 
(whether based on the dignity of a rational mind, or equality of intel- 
ligence, or some other mythos) is that we possess a powerful need to 
level charges of stupidity against others we disagree with. The opinion 
of inequality that underpins such accusations is what distracts us from 
the possibility of equality – even (perhaps especially!) when someone is 
insisting upon equality for all! Rancière suggests that all distraction is  
at root the opinion of inequality of intelligence27. Once the will is dis- 
tracted in this way, it loses the ability to engage with others as equals, 
and instead enters into rhetorical battles that pull minds into unstable 
orbits28, plummeting from the truth like a fallen star. 
This is the doomed path towards politics-as-war, where we no longer 
need to engage with each other in political discourse because once we 
know we are right it is simply a matter of enforcing what we know is 
right. But politics is not the name of a struggle for power, but the config- 
uration of a space of discourse29. Inequality of intelligence made sense 
in a peculiarly two-dimensional kind of universe, one where being right 
ensured that everyone else was wrong. It doesn’t make sense in a multi- 
verse, in an ecology of practices where different kinds of knowledge can 
put people into different orbits around the truth. “Truth settles no conflict 
in the public space”, Rancière suggests; it is found only in the solitude of 
individual conscience, and “withdraws the moment that conflict erupts 
between two consciences.”30 
 
Despite the commitment to equality for all, the Marxist is distracted 
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whenever they see in landowners and shareholders only enemies to      
be defeated, and not fellow citizens whose intelligence must also be 
respected. The Capitalist is distracted whenever they insist that their 
commercial success is evidence of their superiority (the circular link 
between intelligence and success in education once more!), and that 
everyone else must therefore deserve their poverty. Like the Marxist, the 
atheist often fights honourable for equal rights but is all too easily dis- 
tracted whenever they see solely the impossibility of religion producing 
objective knowledge, and never that the knowledge-practices of religious 
people reveal their veracity in sustaining communities of care. The theist 
is equivalently distracted whenever they profess that everyone is equal 
in the eyes of God, but then insists that anyone who does not agree with 
them is damned to an eternity in Hell – as if they (and not their Maker) 
were the ultimate judge of souls. As I said before, this is truly the Age of 
Distraction! 
The sciences, religions, and political systems all have an element of 
veracity to them, or they would not have their adherents, but they all 
carry a risk of distraction and the possibility of catastrophic failure as 
well, something that Alain Badiou has been eloquent in expounding in 
the context of fidelity to a truth31. Religion and political ideology are 
already widely suspected, for both good and for bad reasons, but we have 
to be especially careful with the sciences too. The legacy of Descartes 
that passed to us through the Vienna circle leads to the seduction of facts 
that is just as poisonous for politics as religious and factional bigotry. 
 
The image of a universe allowed the work of scientists to seem to be     
a journey with an already established goal, or a building that could be 
made by adding brick by brick. But as Midgley observes, this fails to 
recognise that the sciences are a cumulative, living enterprise, where 
solving one problem always raises others that require new approaches32. 
As Isabelle Stengers makes clear, each apparatus that turns an object into 
a reliable witness and thus produces objective knowledge (the knowl- 
edge  of  objects)  then  goes  on  to  create  new  questions33. To  pursue 
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research is to adapt our scientific knowledge-practices to new problems, 
and this process could potentially go on as long as our species does. 
The problem with the seduction of facts is that it prevents politics by 
making experts into ‘superiors’ against whom everyone is ‘inferior’. 
Even the experts are judged inferior to each other, as anonymous peer 
review demonstrates. What lies behind this distraction is a faith that 
expertise can be purged of metaphysics, as the Vienna circle believed, or 
that there can be metaphysical views that have no moral or political bias. 
Midgley justifiably disputes this assumption, and furthermore makes the 
point that there  is no dishonour in having ideals  – quite the opposite,  
in fact. We should not attempt to smuggle bias under the cloak of 
expertise34. That was precisely what went wrong with anonymous peer 
review. 
 
Equality of intelligence, or Kant’s mutual respect, is not some distant 
goal to achieve, like an equal society (whatever that is supposed to 
mean), but rather a point of departure35. Whichever conceptual route we 
take to get to the veracity of this vision, it is only through an ideal of 
this kind that we can truly belong to a community of equals. Rancière 
dreams of “a society of artists”, who would share this emancipated view 
of our relationship to one another. No superiors, no inferiors. Rather, the 
superior application of knowledge-practices is recognised as the product 
of a strong will to learn, while inferior skills are merely the outcome of 
someone not seeking that particular knowledge, and never evidence of a 
lesser being36. 
Living together like this is not just an ideal, it is a practice, the practice 
of emancipation, of Enlightenment. Society will always be irrational, but 
we can still learn ways to ‘rave reasonably’ together37. We just need to 
learn to be equal in our unequal societies38. More than this, we have     
to learn to cultivate virtuous discourse, because without this our pol- 
itics – the space where we can talk about how we are going to live 
together – is impossible. It is equally endangered whenever we attempt 
to  make  consensus  a kind of fact to  be wielded  as  a weapon,  as  has 
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increasingly happened over the previous century. We have forgotten that 
a genuine politics must always be a discourse of dissensus39, otherwise 
we are trapped in politics-as-war, where one claim of necessary consen- 
sus opposes another, power and distraction reign, and equality is merely 
another contested battleground between liberal and conservative, atheist 
and theist, Marxist and Capitalist. 
 
We can now return to the place where we began, the Wikipedia, and ask 
again: what does the Wikipedia know? When I first concluded that the 
Wikipedia knows nothing, this was based on the old understanding of 
knowledge as justified true belief. But if knowledge is a practice, then 
the Wikipedia is something quite different from a conventional ency- 
clopaedia, for all its apparent similarities. Badiou has justifiably used the 
encyclopaedia as the very image of the received opinions of any given 
time and place, because the old understanding of knowledge has this sta- 
tic quality that lends itself to being written down. He contrasts this to 
the intense experience of truth, which punctures through all traditional 
views of knowledge in events that are impossible to anticipate, or even 
adequately explain40. The truth always exceeds opinion, and can never 
be reduced to it41. 
 
On the new understanding of knowledge as a practice, the Wikipedia as 
a text still knows nothing, because a page of facts is not a knowledge- 
practice but merely a collection of the side-effects of those practices. Yet 
the Wikipedia is not solely a vast set of pages recording facts of one 
kind or another, but also a community. Indeed, there is genuine politics 
between the editors of the Wikipedia, because there is always dissensus, 
even if occasionally one group of editors, or a lone anonymous vandal, 
denies the political veracity of the Wikipedia by forcing one vision onto 
the page through abuse of power or scurrilous deceit. 
Jimmy Wales’ image of the Wikipedia as ‘The Free Encyclopaedia that 
anyone can edit’ has been used as a means of attacking its credentials  
by suggesting it is driven by a “cult of the amateur”42. Yet if all we are 
doing is collecting facts, why would we need experts? Indeed, in allow- 
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ing anyone at all the opportunity to edit, the Wikipedia is an authen-    
tic product of the Enlightenment, in that it assumes neither superior nor 
inferior, and grants everyone something close to equality of intelligence. 
True, not everyone has the will to learn its rather peculiar practices – but 
everyone is afforded the opportunity to try. 
 
At the same time, the Wikipedia is all too frequently held back by the 
ever-persistent image of a universe that continually suggests that each 
page of the Wikipedia has some correct way of being. This perspective 
becomes suspect in the light of plural realism and the ecology of prac- 
tices. But this limitation is not a property of the Wikipedia nor of its edi- 
torial practices, but rather of the community that edits it, and the political 
space that it constitutes has to accept this dissensus or else give up the 
equality of intelligence implied by allowing anyone to edit. In this, it is 
only a manifestation of the problems of knowledge that we have inher- 
ited from Plato and so many other philosophers along the way. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, examining the importance that the Victorians placed 
upon the encyclopaedia as a symbol of the unity of knowledge, demon- 
strates the enormous difficulties entailed today in maintaining the same 
kind of vision that made the Ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britan- 
nica a shining symbol of the quest for truth when it was written in the 
1880s43. In academic circles, a variety of influences – especially Niet- 
zsche’s genealogical method, which first appeared (not coincidentally) 
in 188744 – have made the whole project of a universal encyclopae-    
dia questionable, precisely because the idea of a universe of all knowl- 
edge has become suspect. As MacIntyre makes clear, encyclopaedias 
have become “mere collections of facts pragmatically ordered for conve- 
nience of reference”45 since the faith in an attainable unity of knowledge 
that previously animated such projects has been substantially lost among 
the community of experts. 
 
The Wikipedia, in inheriting the encyclopaedic project but then ‘out- 
sourcing’ the referencing work to all comers, inherits serious conceptual 
problems that its community is perhaps only dimly aware of. Because its 
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practices rest upon compiling expert testimony, there is no viable syn- 
thesis of knowledge possible without editors making their own judge- 
ments as to the credentials, reliability, or notability of everything to be 
included or excluded. Perhaps as a result, it has not worked out in prac- 
tice that ‘anyone can edit’ the Wikipedia, since an oligarchy of long- 
standing editors have the greatest influence on its content46. It is perhaps 
also worth bearing in mind that the peer production of content seems 
inevitably to result in such oligarchies of control47. A great many of the 
well-established Wikipedia editors are not anonymous, but an authentic 
transparency of process is still hopelessly difficult to attain in so vast a 
network, and accountability is notoriously elusive in any diffuse, large- 
scale community. It is hard to avoid the conclusion reached by Adele 
Santana and Donna Wood that “Wikipedia has the appearance, but not 
the reality, of responsible, transparent information production”48. 
 
If on the one hand the Wikipedia is an embodiment of equality of intelli- 
gence, its other hand is constantly wrestling with that emancipation and 
striking it down in discord. For just like anonymous peer review, the 
Wikipedia fails Kant’s transparency principle by failing to engender trust 
in its masked editors, and hence in itself. The mask is available in its 
strongest form through the anonymous, unregistered accounts, but even 
the identified editors are effectively shielded by the insurmountable diffi- 
culty of attaining transparency of process. This editorial obfuscation per- 
mits politics-as-war to infest the pages of the Wikipedia as surely as it 
does our nations and local institutions. How many people have used the 
mask to sabotage the facts of the Wikipedia, or to manipulate pages to 
accord with a singular distracted vision? 
 
That many people would not edit the Wikipedia if they had to be iden- 
tified is no more convincing an argument for anonymity than it was      
in the case of peer review, although Paul de Laat’s suggestion that the 
social contract of the Wikipedia requires anonymity is more compelling. 
It amounts to emphasising equality of intelligence, and trusting that this 
can win out against the problems it must wrestle against in practice. But 
if editorial power within the Wikipedia is possessed by a community 
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of the dedicated, we ought to wonder if Jimmy Wales’ vision for the 
Wikipedia as a ‘Free Encyclopaedia that anyone can edit’ is even plau- 
sible. After all, it is not at all clear that the concept of unitary knowl- 
edge inherent to the idea of a universal encyclopaedia is attainable by 
any process, whether it is manifested as a wiki or as a book. 
The outcast Catholic priest Ivan Illich suggested that we had misunder- 
stood technology if we think it is always beneficial to human well-being 
and flourishing. Rather, only some of our tools are convivial – they fos- 
ter individual competence and control, and help us create societies where 
we can be politically inter-related49. His favoured example of a convivial 
tool is the bicycle, which ensures the equality of its users, and fosters 
individuality in a way that cars do not, since they create a superiority of 
the road traveller above the local community, not least of all by dividing 
land with spaces that are impassable on foot50. I have argued that this 
critique runs even deeper today, because we consistently invest technol- 
ogy with a mythic power to save us that it not only lacks in almost all 
cases, but that also conceals its capacity to destroy both morality and life 
when we cannot distinguish convivial tools from the alternatives51. 
 
The Wikipedia is not a convivial tool, but it is still closer to conviviality 
than any encyclopaedia before it. I fear it can never be entirely convivial 
while the identity of editors is hidden behind masks of various kinds, and 
despite the hostility towards unregistered editors amongst its community 
I have no expectation that this will change any time soon, or indeed ever. 
But the idea of a wiki as a convivial tool is one that I find compelling, 
and I cannot help but wonder whether communities of equals joined in 
political dissensus through convivial technology could be assisted by 
tools such as these. When a community of Wikipedia editors avoids dis- 
traction, the results can be impressive. They can match traditional ency- 
clopaedias in the knowledge-practice of gathering and referencing facts. 
There is a message here, if we want to read it. 
 
Maybe the Wikipedia does not know nothing… maybe what the 
Wikipedia knows is that there were never superiors and inferiors, that 
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we all possess equal intelligence, and that an encyclopaedia can never be 
completed because that would mean that knowledge was merely an edi- 
fice to be built to some pre-existing template. That was what the image 
of a universe gave us, but this ideal for truth now seems quite hard to 
accept outside the limited case of objective knowledge. Truth is some- 
thing we can all experience, but it is not what produces facts. Facts are 
merely the residue of our knowledge-practices, and it is because our dif- 
ferent practices can know in so many different ways that we live in the 
many real worlds of our multiverse. Yet universe and multiverse are only 
different names for the same truth, and that truth is that we all live here 
together. I don’t know… maybe it’s time we found out what that really 
means. 
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 Glossary 
 
 
 
Anonymous peer review: either of two kinds of peer review  where   
the reviewers’ identities are kept anonymous, namely single blind peer 
review and double-blind peer review (q.q.v.). 
 
Contact theory: Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor’s term for those 
models of experience that recognise we have direct transactions with 
reality, and do not need to distinguish between an ‘inner’ world of expe- 
rience and an ‘outer’ world of reality. See also veracity (q.v.). 
 
Convivial: Ivan Illich’s term for tools that foster individual competence 
and control (e.g. the bicycle), and for societies in which technology 
serves politically interrelated individuals. 
 
Dissensus: Jacques Rancière’s concept that politics requires the recog- 
nition of disagreement or else it cannot be a space for discussing how   
to live together, but only a politically-empty power struggle to enforce a 
pre-conceived consensus. 
 
Double-blind peer review: peer review where the identity of the writer 
is kept anonymous from the reviewers, and the identity of the reviewers 
are kept anonymous from everyone. Compare single-blind peer review 
and open peer review (q.q.v.). 
 
Ecology of Practices: Isabelle Stengers’ term for the array of diverse 
human practices (q.v.) that impinge upon one another, creating conflicts 
and tensions, but also widening the perspectives and skills that are avail- 
able. See also multiverse, plural realism (q.q.v.). 
 
Equality of intelligence: Jacques Rancière’s idea that we all possess 
equal intelligence, and that our differences stem from how we have cho- 
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sen to apply our intelligence, and not from any fundamental intellectual 
differences. 
 
Event: something that occurs, what Alfred North Whitehead considers 
the ultimate substance of nature. 
 
Fact: an assertion that can be made reliably (and that can be verified), 
which emerges from the refinement of a knowledge-practice (q.v.). See 
also seduction of facts (q.v.). 
 
Infernal alternative: Isabelle Stengers and Philippe Pignarre’s term for 
a situation where the status quo is claimed to be impossible to challenge, 
and the only possible response is either resignation or ineffectual denun- 
ciation. 
 
Justified true belief: a widespread philosophical view of knowledge as 
a belief that both corresponds to reality and that is held for reasons that 
are justified. Compare knowledge-practice (q.v.). 
 
Knowledge: an understanding of some kind. In this book, the main- 
stream philosophical view of knowledge as justified true belief is con- 
trasted to knowledge-practices (q.q.v.). 
 
Knowledge-practice: any practice that can be performed with a degree 
of reliability and that allows for the assertion of facts (q.q.v.) as a side 
effect of its execution. 
 
Metaphysics: the philosophical exploration of that which cannot be 
tested or proven i.e. claims concerning reality that exceed experience or 
direct evidence. See also mythos (q.v.). 
 
Multiverse: a term coined by William James and popularized by 
Michael Moorcock for a diversity of realities, a ‘many-in-one’. The term 
can either mean a plurality of parallel physical dimensions, or a plurality 
of parallel experiential realities, but in this work it is used in the latter 
sense. See also plural realism, ecology of practices (q.q.v.). 
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Mutual respect: the agreement between individuals to respect one 
another’s individuality arising from our shared rationality, expressed in 
Kant’s philosophy as a facet of the fundamental principle of morality. 
See also equality of intelligence (q.v.). 
 
Mythos: a collection of imaginative patterns that underlie a particular 
perspective on existence. See also metaphysics (q.q.v.). 
 
Non-religion: a tradition with a specific mythos and shared moral prac- 
tices that is distinct from the religious traditions, despite having some 
commonality with them e.g. Marxism, positivism (q.q.v.). 
 
Objective knowledge: Isabelle Stengers’ concept of the ‘knowledge of 
objects’, which researchers access only through the creation of apparatus 
that successfully resist objections. This makes the object being studied 
into a reliable witness (q.v.). 
 
Open peer review: peer review where the identity of the reviewers is 
public knowledge. This book uses the term only in this sense, but else- 
where it can be used to mean open-access peer review, where the reviews 
are made public, or open-invitation peer review, where anyone can sub- 
mit a review. Compare blind peer review, double-blind peer review 
(q.q.v.). 
 
Paper: an academic essay submitted for a journal or conference. 
 
Peer review: the provision of judgement and feedback on written work. 
See also blind peer review, double-blind peer review, and open peer 
review (q.q.v.). 
 
Politics: collective discourse about how we live together that is open to 
question and negotiation. Compare politics-as-war (q.v.). 
 
Politics-as-war: a form of political life based upon defeating opposing 
viewpoints within the legislature and thus enforcing your own political 
values upon others. Compare politics, seduction of facts (q.q.v.). 
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Positivism: a diverse collection of scientific non-religions (q.v.) based 
upon either dismissing all untestable matters, or faith in the sciences as 
the most reliable (or sole) source of truth. 
 
Positivist: a person who believes in some form of positivism (q.v.). 
 
Plural Realism: Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor’s term for a view 
on existence that recognises we are all in contact with reality, but that 
each means of such contact possesses its own terms. See also ecology of 
practices, multiverse (q.q.v.). 
 
Practice: an activity that becomes more reliable through its exercise, and 
that is shared by some community. All skills can be understood as prac- 
tices. 
 
Realism: the claim that truth has a meaning that transcends individual 
differences of perception or being, and thus that  it  can  be established 
or verified by some means (often in contemporary versions of realism 
through scientific practices). Compare relativism (q.v.). 
 
Relativism: a rejection of the idea that truth can be securely established, 
or even that truth is a viable concept. The term is often deployed dis- 
paragingly against those who reject the meaning of truth in various dif- 
ferent ways. Compare realism (q.v.). 
 
Reliable witness: Isabelle Stengers’ term for a process that allows 
speaking on behalf of something else, e.g. when a researcher in animal 
behaviour talks faithfully about the animals they study, the animals are a 
reliable witness, and the researcher is their spokesperson (q.v.). 
 
Seduction of facts: the political temptation to substitute the assertion of 
facts for the space of discourse that is authentic politics (q.v.) . 
 
Single blind peer review: peer review where the reviewers’ identities 
are kept anonymous. Compare double-blind peer review and open peer 
review (q.q.v.). 
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Spokesperson: Bruno Latour’s term for those (particularly researchers) 
who speak on behalf of other entities (particularly non-human entities) 
via whatever process will allow those entities to form a reliable witness 
(q.v.) e.g. when a mathematician asserts a mathematical truth, they are a 
spokesperson for numbers. 
 
Subjective knowledge: in this book, this concept is tautological and 
vacuous, equating to just ‘knowledge’: every knowledge-practice is con- 
ducted by subjects, and even objective knowledge (q.q.v.) is produced 
this way. 
 
Tradition: any human activity with a specific focus, set of methods,  
and its own values can be considered a tradition e.g. cartography, Chess, 
chemistry, Christianity, cooperage, crochet. This term is broadly equiva- 
lent to Isabelle Stengers’ use of the term ‘practice’. 
 
Transparency principle: an alternative name for Kant’s principle of 
publicity, which suggests that any institutional policy is unjust if making 
it known would render it impossible to implement. 
 
Veracity: Jacques Rancière’s principle of accordance with a truth that is 
experienced rather than known with certainty, metaphorically expressed 
as each person having their own individual orbit around the truth. See 
also contact theory (q.v.). 
 
Vienna circle: the positivist movement of the 1920s and 1930s that con- 
sidered metaphysics (q.q.v) meaningless because they could not be veri- 
fied. 
 
Virtuous discourse: communication between individuals who engage 
with one another as equals and are committed to understanding one 
another’s perspective, which ideally is also openly available for others to 
read. 
 
Will: the capacity to act decisively towards goals or desires. 
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insightful. We are interested in creating projects with Sophie and with In 
Media Res, and we will accept submissions and publish work in a variety 
of media (textual, electronic, digital, etc.), and we work with The Game 
Crafter to produce tabletop games. 
 
Authors publishing with ETC Press retain ownership of their intellectual 
property. ETC Press publishes a version of the text with author permis- 
sion and ETC Press publications will be released under one of two Cre- 
ative Commons licenses: 
 
• Attribution-NoDerivativeWorks-NonCommercial: This license 
allows for published works to remain intact, but versions can be 
created. 
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• Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike: This license allows 
for authors to retain editorial control of their creations while also 
encouraging readers to collaboratively rewrite content. 
 
Every text is available for free download, and we price our titles as inex- 
pensively as possible, because we want people to have access to them. 
We’re most interested in the sharing and spreading of ideas. 
 
This is definitely an experiment in the notion of publishing, and we 
invite people to participate. We are exploring what it means to “publish” 
across multiple media and multiple versions. We believe this is the future 
of publication, bridging virtual and physical media with fluid versions of 
publications as well as enabling the creative blurring of what constitutes 
reading and writing. 
 
http://www.etc.cmu.edu/etcpress/wellplayed 
Twitter: @etcwellplayed 
